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Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the
Best Interests Standard
MargaretHoward*
I.

Introduction

The child placement system in the United States is governed by
the best interests principle: that intervention and placement or other
disposition should be carried out only to further the best interests of
the affected child. This principle is sometimes stated as the standard
for decision-a rule-and at other times as the goal the system is
intended to achieve-a policy. The best interests test, however, is
unacceptable as either rule or policy. If regarded as a rule, the test is
so general and vague that it provides no standard at all, and thus no
guidance for decision-making. When stated as the underlying policy,
the test actually inhibits real analysis of the competing values in
child placement decisions and evaluation of the weight that each of
these values should receive.
The best interests concept itself includes several different and
competing interests, and using the same phrase to describe all of
them obscures this important fact. The effect of this obfuscation is to
include in child placement decisions considerations that serve other
political and social ends but are unrelated to the best interests of the
affected child. Including these interests under the rubric of best interests of the child suggests that concern for the individual child is
paramount when in fact the implementation of other social policies is
given controlling effect, sometimes at the expense of the individual
child's welfare.
Analysis of the best interests of children in the particular circumstances of transracial adoption has suffered from this deficient
conceptualization because transracial adoption, like all other adoptions, is governed by the best interests test. All children in need of
homes clearly have an identifiable interest in being part of a stable
and permanent family. In the context of transracial placement, however, another important and competing interest arises-the child's
*
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interest in his or her cultural identity as a member of a minority
group. Heavier weighting of the former encourages transracial
placement for a minority child if no in-race home is available. Emphasis on maintaining cultural identity, on the other hand, discourages transracial placement.
Other interests may also be identified in transracial adoption
cases. Because child placement agencies are so instrumental in determining whether transracial placements are made, their organizational interests are influential, although these interests should be the
least weighty of any. Minority groups whose children may be placed
transracially have at least two identifiable interests-an interest in
decision-making power and an interest in continuing to exist as discrete groups. Thus they have an interest in the cultural identity of
the minority child that closely parallels the child's own interest in his
or her cultural identity, because of the impact each child's identity
may have on the life of the group.
This article will first review the factors contributing to the rise'
and ultimate decline 2 of transracial placements of black and Indian
children. 3 After discussing the competing interests involved in transracial adoptions and suggesting a normative hierarchy of these interests, 4 this article will examine various fact situations arising in
transracial placement cases and propose resolutions in light of that
1 See text accompanying notes 6-52 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 53-125 infra.
3 All transracial adoptions raise issues of cultural identity and group continuity, whether
white parents adopt children from American minority groups or non-Americans, such as
Asians, brought into the United States for the purpose of adoption. The ramifications of
these issues, however, may be different for American minority children than for non-Americans. For example, questions of acceptance by the white majority and realistically available
alternatives to transracial placement are different for the two groups. This article, therefore,
will not discuss international adoptions, despite the fact that such adoptions are often interracial.
More specifically, this article will focus on the two American minority groups most affected by transracial adoption-blacks and Indians. Blacks are included because they constitute this nation's largest and most visible minority group. They have experienced a unique
history of slavery, constitutional amendment, and civil rights struggle. Blacks live in virtually
all areas of the country (although they compose a percentage of population that varies from
one locality to another). And, nearly all whites have formed attitudes about blacks that
might affect their opinions concerning the acceptability of white parents' adoption of black
children.
Other minority groups, such as Indians, Asians, and Hispanics, are much more localized.
Issues surrounding adoption of these children by white parents are accordingly more localized. Nevertheless, Indians are included in this article because the problem of Indian child
placement has been the subject of congressional study and legislation, and because transracial
adoption has had a unique and adverse impact on Indian tribes.
4 See text accompanying notes 126-2 10 inja.
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hierarchy.5 The various elements encompassed under the best interests label can thereby be traced and cases resolved, if not with more
agreement among competing groups, then at least with more analytical clarity on the part of social workers and judges called upon to
decide these cases.
II. The Increase in Transracial Placements
A number of factors led to the increased use of transracial placements beginning in the 1950's and 1960's. Their history can be understood only against the background of these forces.
First, the number of children coming into the placement system
increased dramatically with identification by the medical profession
in the early 1960's of the battered child syndrome6 and subsequent
passage of laws requiring suspected cases of child abuse to be reported. 7 A disproportionate number of these abused children were
from poor families and were black or Indian, perhaps because greater
surveillance of poor families resulted from their contact with welfare
agencies, and because there were no options for poor parents temporarily unable to care for their children.
Second, the deficiencies of the foster care system8 became increasingly apparent. Despite the theoretically temporary nature of
foster care,9 most children in foster care are there for several years,
and substantial numbers of them are never returned to their fami5 See text accompanying notes 211-40 infra.
6 The seminal article was, perhaps, Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver,
The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 AM. MED. Assoc. J. 17 (1962).
7 Legislatures responded quickly to publication of these clinical findings. Between 1963
and 1967, all 50 states passed some form of child abuse reporting statute. V. DE FRANCIS,
CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970s 5 (1974), quoted in R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY
AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 318 (1978).
8 A great deal of attention has been focused on the foster care system and how it works.
This literature is only summarized here; for more extensive discussions see, e.g., R. HUBBELL,
FOSTER CARE AND FAMILIES (1981); Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV.
EDUC. REv. 599 (1973); Musewicz, The Failureof Foster Care: FederalStatutor Reform and the
Child's Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 633 (1981); Wald, State Intervention on Behalfof
"Neglected" Childre." Standardsfor Removal of Childrenfrom Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of
Children in Foster Care,and Tennination of arentalRights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976). Professor
Wald's article, perhaps, should be cited only with apologies to that author, who left clear
instructions to those who follow him that "[t]his Article will self-destruct in five years." Id. at
700. The continued importance of his work, however, is both a recognition of its quality and
value and an admission that the more extensive data he hoped for, id. at 700 n. 290, is coming
in a trickle rather than a cleansing flood.
9 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Note, Long-Tem Foster
Parentand Children Have No ProtectableInterest in Their Relationship, 29 MERCER L. REV. 1137,
1141 (1978).
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lies. 10 In addition, many children in foster care are subjected to multiple foster placements, I which have particularly detrimental effects
on their emotional development.' 2 And whatever the negative impacts of the system on children in general, for minority children the
system is even worse.' 3
Third, clinical data identifying the effects of maternal deprivation resulting from institutional care on infants' psychological development 4 were reported. The data created an impetus to replace
10 Professor Wald has estimated that between 40 and 80% of children removed from
abusive or neglectful homes are never returned to their parents and that the probability of
reunion between the child and his or her parents declines markedly after the first year spent
in foster care. Wald, supra note 8, at 662-63; see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. at 835 (1977) (stating the district court's finding of fact to the same effect).
The median time spent in foster care by children in New York is more than 4 years,
Smith, 431 U.S. at 836, and over 30% of them are in care more than 5 years, Besharov, State
Intervention to Protect Children: New York's Definitions of "Child Abuse" and "Child Neglect," 26
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 723, 770-71 (1981). Long-term placement is known to be detrimental to
children. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 384-b(1)(b) (McKinney 1983); Vieni, TransracialAdoption Is a Solution Now, 20 Soc. WORK 419, 420 (1975).
11 This fact has been labeled "one of the most severe deficiencies of the existing system."
Wald, supra note 8, at 645 n.107.
In New York, 60% of the children in foster care have experienced more than one placement, and 28% have experienced three or more placements. Smith, 431 U.S. at 837. Even
children eventually placed in foster homes may spend some time in a shelter or other institution while a foster home is located, Wald, supra note 8, at 631, and 80% of children removed
from a foster home go to another foster home rather than back to their families, Smith, 431
U.S. at 829 n.23.
12 Multiple placements are detrimental because they subject children "to discontinuities
that may impair normal developmental processes" and "may impair the child's ability to
form lasting attachments." Wald, supra note 8, at 671. It is most important to avoid multiple
placements for children under the age of three (and available figures indicate that 43% of
children entering foster care in New York are three or under, Smith, 431 U.S. at 836 n.38)
because of these detrimental effects on developmental needs of children at that age, Wald,
supra note 8, at 695. Lengthy placement coupled with multiple placements is especially
harmful. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 31-35, 39 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
13 Minority children are in foster care in disproportionate numbers. Smith, 431 U.S. at
833-34; Macaulay & Macaulay, Adoptionfor Black Children: A Case Stud of Expert Discretion, in 1
RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 265, 273 (R. Simon ed. 1978); Wald, supra note 8, at 629.
This is true for both blacks and Indians, but the situation of Indian children is much more
extreme. Indian children have been placed in foster care in Maine at a rate 19 times the rate
for non-Indians, in Minnesota at a rate 17 times the rate for non-Indians, and in South Dakota at a rate 22 times the rate for non-Indians. ASSOCIATION ON AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS, INC., INDIAN CHILD WELFARE STATISTICAL SURVEY, July 1976 [hereinafter cited as
AAIA Survey], reprintedin Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977 Hearingson . 1214 Before the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 537, 538 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. When placements for adoption and figures for Indian children attending boarding
school are added, Indian children in New Mexico have been separated from their families at a
rate 74 times greater than non-Indians. Id
14 BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 17-19, and sources cited therein at 115
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institutionalization with a foster care system.' 5 Maternal deprivation

is caused by early separation of an infant from its mother and results
in "[a]n inability to form relationships with adults or contemporaries,
inadequate intellectual function, apathy and indifference to one's

world, and poor physical stamina."' 6 These clinical findings, based
principally upon the work of child psychiatrists, have more recently
supported developmental theories asserting that children need a continuous and stable relationship with an adult caretaker for adequate

development. The best known proponents of this position are Joseph
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, authors of Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child.'7 Their theories of "continuity of care" and the

"psychological parent"'
and courts.'

9

8

are well accepted among child care workers
This clinical work has contributed to the view that fos-

15 Institutionalization was replaced by foster care as the detriments of the former became
known. Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 270. The rate of foster care and institutional placement, however, varies from state to state. Professor Wald found, for example, that
50% of children in placement in Nebraska were in institutions, but that in Utah 99.7% were in
foster care. Wald, supra note 8, at 630-31 n.30. The record in Smith, 431 U.S. at 826 n.13,
indicated that 72% of the children under state supervision in New York were in foster homes.
16 B. FLINT, THE CHILD AND THE INSTITUTION xi (1966), quotedin Note, RacialMatching
and the Adoption Dilemma: Alternativesfor the Hard to Place, 17 J. FAM. L. 333, 356 (1979).
17

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 12.

18 Professor Goldstein and Drs. Freud and Solnit used the phrase "psychological parent"
to describe the adult with whom a child has formed the emotional attachments necessary for
healthy emotional and psychological growth. Id at 17-20. This relationship is based on daily
interaction and "[t]he role can be fulfilled either by a biological parent or by an adoptive
parent or by any other caring adult-but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his
biological or legal relationship to the child may be." Id.at 19.
"Continuity of care" and relationships describe the stable and permanent environment a
child needs in order to experience normal development. Id at 31-35. "The instability of all
mental processes during the period of development needs to be offset by stability and uninterrupted support from external sources. Smooth growth is arrested or disrupted when upheavals and changes in the external world are added to the internal ones." Id. at 32. The
implication of this guideline is that placements should be permanent, not temporary or conditional. Id at 35.
19 See,e.g., Miller v. Berks County Children & Youth Servs. (In re Davis), 465 A.2d 614,
632 (Pa. 1983). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), stated that the briefs filed in the case "dispute at some length
the validity of the 'psychological parent' theory propounded" by Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit, and referred to their book as "indeed controversial." Id at 844 n.52. A close reading
of the book reviews cited by the Supreme Court, as well as others, indicates that the criticisms
leveled at Beond the Best Interests of the Child were generally directed to points other than the
authors' psychological parent and continuity of care theories.
For example, the Strausses criticized Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit for their failure to
recognize that natural parents (and especially noncustodial parents) have independent rights,
for their view of multi-hearing cases as paradigmatic, and for their failure to appreciate the
role played by legal rules in planning by lawyers and their clients. The reviewers added,
however, that "[t]his criticism, we should stress, does not impair other conclusions bearing on
the custody process--in particular,. . . that the principal determinant of the custody award
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ter care, originally espoused as preferable to institutionalization, is
itself a less attractive alternative than permanent placement, whether
such permanence is achieved by leaving the child in his or her home
20
in the first place or by locating an adoptive home.
The weight of current opinion is that a stable family may be the
single most important factor in children's healthy emotional development. 2 1 Thus, children should remain with their parents whenever
be the least detrimental alternative, stressing strength and continuity in the psychological
relationships the child enjoys." Strauss & Strauss, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 966,
1005 (1974) (footnote omitted).
In addition to citing the Strausses' review, the Court also cited Kadushin, Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child- An Essay Review, 48 Soc. SERV. REV. 508, 508-10 (1974). That reviewer
criticized the authors' multiple failures: to consult workers who will be charged with implementing the recommendations; to recognize that continuity now may mean discontinuity
later; to justify giving priority to the child's rights instead of the parent's; and their unfamiliarity with the social work literature. The reviewer, however, had the following words of
praise:
The book offers the sponsorship of eminent and respected names to some significant
points of view which need the endorsements of such authoritative champions.
Among these are. . . the need to recognize the difference between biological and
psychological parenthood . . . and the primacy of importance to the child of the
psychological parent; the overriding importance of continuity of care for the child
Id at 509.
The Court did not cite Dembitz, Beyond Any Discipline's Competence, 83 YALE L.J. 1304
(1974), but it is a leading, highly critical review of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. That
reviewer, however, referred to the "indisputable value" of continuity of relationships and
stated that the authors' "major contribution" is "their emphasis on the child's right to the
best 'psychological' parent, regardless of competing adult claims." Id at 1309, 1313.
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child received a reception best described as mixed. Reviewers have been highly critical of several positions taken by the authors, such as their assertion
that noncustodial parents should have no legally enforceable right to visit their children, and
the authors' reliance on concepts of continuity and psychological parenthood to the exclusion
of competing values. See, e.g., Dembitz, supra note 19. The theories of psychological
parenthood and continuity of care themselves, however, have been well received; cf. Crouch,
An Essay on the CriticalandJudicialReception of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L.Q.
49 (1979).
20 Wald, supra note 8, at 671-72; Grossman, A Child of a DijFerent Color: Race as a Factorin
Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 303, 328-29 (1968); Comment, Adoptions
for the Hard-to-Place."The Role of the Court and the Trend Against Matching, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV.
749, 765 (1971).
21 Commentators and courts alike recognize the significance of a stable family in a child's
emotional development, although they phrase it in various ways: Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 788-89 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("A stable, loving homelife is essential to a
child's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being."); Smith, 431 U.S. at 844 ("Thus the
importance of the familial relationship. . . stems from the emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association. . . ."); L. GROW & D. SHAPIRO, BLACK CHILDRENWHITE PARENTS: A STUDY OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
GROW & SHAPIRO I] (reporting that some black adoption workers saw transracial adoption
"as a perhaps less-preferable but nevertheless pragmatic means of giving black children the
kind of continuing care, nurturance and sense of belonging so important to the child's opti-
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possible, because of the developmental importance of the emotional
ties between a child and even a "bad" parent.2 2 If removal from the
home is necessary, the child's developmental needs are least disrupted if contact between parent and child is maintained, and the
child is returned quickly.23 If fairly rapid return is impossible, the
child's emotional development is least disrupted if he or she is rapidly
and permanently placed with another family. When parental rights
24
are terminated, adoption provides that permanent family setting.
As recognition of the importance of a stable family to a child's development grew, pressure built to find adoptive homes for those children in foster care who were available for adoption.
Fourth, the number of healthy white infants available for adoption declined dramatically. A number of trends resulted in this decline, including increased availability of contraceptives and, later,
the legalization of abortion.2 5 Also, reduced social stigma surroundmum physical, emotional, and social development"); Grossman, supra note 20, at 331-32
("The most significant element in a child's development, according to most authorities, is the
environment in which he spends his early years. . . . The role of the family in this process is,
of course pervasive."); Comment, Matchingfor Adoption: A Stud of Current Trends, 22 CATH.
LAW. 70, 72 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Matchingfor Adoption] (There is "unanimous agreement among child experts that a stable home life with its attendant security and
continuity is essential to a child's emotional and psychological well-being."); Comment, The
InterracialAdoption Implications of Drummond v.Fulton County Department of Famiy and Children
Services, 17 J. FAM. L. 117, 151 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Drummond Comment] (Psychological parent-child relationships are accorded "paramount importance. . . by the most eminent
sociologists, psychologists and psychiatrists of our time."); Note, supra note 9, at 1148 ("Psychologists and sociologists are almost unanimous in recognizing that a stable environment is a
major element of a healthy, happy childhood."); Comment, supra note 20, at 766 ("What is
important is not that there is a large degree of identity between the adoptive parents and the
child, but rather that the child is placed in a loving home with an atmosphere conducive to
healthy and normal development.").
22 BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 19; Wald, supra note 8, at 639-40, 644.
23 Wald, supra note 8, at 672-73, 676.
24 If parental rights have not been terminated and the child cannot be returned to his or
her parents in the foreseeable future (which, arguably, is in itself a ground for termination, J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 29-51
(1979) [hereinafter cited as BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS]), then foster care with tenure is the
closest analogue to a permanent family that can be provided. Id. at 49; Wald, supra note 8, at
699-700; Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 290. Subsidized adoption is one way to
encourage less affluent families to adopt. See note 216 infra.
25 R. SIMON & H. ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SIMON & ALTSTEIN I]; Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A CriticalAnalysis, 31
HASTINGS LJ. 1287, 1299 (1980).
A series of Supreme Court opinions was instrumental in the beginning of this development: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a statute criminalizing all
abortions except those to save the mother's life and barring state regulation of abortions performed during the first trimester); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 38 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a statute permitting distribution of contraceptives only to married persons); and
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ing out-of-wedlock births encouraged many mothers to keep their
children rather than release them for adoption.2 6 And finally, the
popularization of zero population growth as a societal goal encouraged couples wanting to increase their families to do so through
27
adoption rather than childbirth.
Two writers have asserted that transracial adoption would never
have gained momentum but for the dearth of healthy white adoptable infants.2 This argument necessarily leads to the conclusion that
transracial adoption primarily serves the interests of white families,
not the interests of waiting black children.2 9 Professional adoption
workers, on the contrary, did not promote transracial adoption as
serving the interests of childless white couples, but as a solution for
black children needing homes. 30 It is perhaps not unduly cynical,
however, to surmise that the demands of white families prompted
agencies to look again at the question of what is in the best interests
of black children and at the concept of "matching" that hindered or
prevented transracial placement.
Matching-which calls for placement of children with parents
to whom they might have been born, i.e., parents with physical,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (reversing conviction for giving contraceptive
information to married persons).
26 GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21, at 3.

27

Id at 4, 67.

28 SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 46, 165. This explanation is much too simplistic because of its failure to recognize the necessary and simultaneous contributions of the
other factors discussed in the text.
29 Transracial adoption was defined originally not as a program to salvage black
children from the effects of foster placement or institutionalization, but as a way of
fulfilling the needs of childless white couples, given the dwindling availability of
white children. Thus it was seen as a white enterprise instituted for the advantage
of the white community.

SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, srupra note 25, at 46 (footnotes omitted); see also Macaulay & Macaulay,
supra note 13, at 286: "At first, the main criticism [of transracial adoption] was that it primarily benefited white families and only served to divert attention from the needs of the
larger number of black children who would not be adopted by whites in any event." (citations omitted).
30 Grow and Shapiro interviewed adoption workers who had made transracial placements and found that the workers were "appropriately concerned with finding a good home
for a child, not with finding a child acceptable to adoptive parents." L. GROW & D. SHAPIRO, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION TODAY: VIEWS OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS AND SOCIAL WORK-

ERS 89 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GROW & SHAPIRO II]. Similarly, Macaulay and
Macaulay found in a review of the professional adoption literature that "transracial adoption

had to be justified as being in the best interest of the black child-not the white family or
society in general." Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 284. Marmor stated that acwhose focus is on what
ceptable applicants for transracial adoption "have to be people ...
they can do for the child rather than on what the child will do for them." Marmor, Psychody-

namic Aspects of TransracialAdoptions, 1964 Soc. WORK PRAC. 200, 207.
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mental, racial, and religious characteristics like theirs, on the premise
that they will adjust more easily to such parents 3 1-was a major obstacle to transracial placements. Decline of the social work profes-

sion's adherence to it was a fifth factor important in the increased
incidence of transracial adoption. Although matching has never
been proved to be important, 32 it remains a part of child placement

ideology33 in diluted form. For constitutional reasons, racial similarity between adoptive parents and adopted children may not be a
determinative factor in the placement decision, but race may be considered as one factor among others.3 4 Matching is currently re31 Grossman, supra note 20, at 318-19; Comment, supra note 20, at 750, 765.
32 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 285. Even when social workers accepted in
principle that matching facilitates adjustment of the child into the family, the practice varied
widely, and workers did not agree on precisely what constituted "sound matching." Grossman, supra note 20, at 318.
Some evidence, in fact, suggests that racial matching is not important. Grow and Shapiro, in their study of black children adopted into white families, found that
children perceived by their parents as obviously black do better than those described as not obviously black. . . . This indicates that the less-well "matched"
children do better than the better "matched," for whom denial of difference is easier. This in turn may mean that parents who acknowledge openly the child's difference may also have the ego strength to deal competently with the problems of child
rearing in general. Conversely, parents who deny the child's difference may also
tend to use this defense mechanism more generally and with negative consequences.
GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21, at 236. The researchers also found that children not
meeting the intellectual expectations of their parents, whether for average or above average
intelligence, did not score as well on certain of the researchers' measures. They concluded,
therefore, that matching for intelligence, although more difficult than matching for race, may
be more important. Id at 236-37.
In a study of Indian children adopted by white parents, Fanshel also found good overall
adjustment, further refuting the importance of racial matching. D. FANSHEL, FAR FROM
THE RESERVATION: THE TRANsRAcIAL ADOPTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN (1972).
33 Comment, Race as a Considerationin Adoption and Custod), Proceedings, 1969 U. ILL. L.F.
256, 259-60; see also Wamser, Child Wefare Under the Indian Child Wefare Act of 1978: A New
Mexico Focus, 10 N.M.L. REv. 413, 418 (1980).
34 Statutes prohibiting transracial adoption are undoubtedly unconstitutional. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir.
1977) .(en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264
(E.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court); In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 786 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982)
(dictum); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). Agency or judicial policy to
deny placement solely on the basis of race is equally unconstitutional despite the absence of a
statute. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C Cir. 1955); Commonweath ex rel. Lucas
v. Kreischer, 221 Pa. Super. 196, 289 A.2d 202 (1972) (Hoffman, J., dissenting), rev'd, 299
A.2d 243 (Pa. 1973).
The cited authorities agree that race is one of the factors that may be taken into consideration in determining the best interests of the child. See also Miller v. Berks County Children
& Youth Servs. (In re Davis) 465 A.2d 614, 622 (Pa. 1983). How that consideration operates
is, however, a matter on which the courts disagree. In re R.A4., on the one hand, provides an
extensive discussion of the constitutionality of such a racial consideration, and asserts that this
factor cannot favor either party.
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garded, at most, as an ideal that must give way when its application
would result in non-adoption or delay in adoption of a particular
child. 35 This approach has the advantage of allowing the benefits of
There is, however, an important caveat: if race is to be a relevant factor, the
court cannot properly weight it, either automatically or presumptively--e., without regard to evidence-for or against cross-racial adoption. To do so would add a
racially discriminatory policy to evaluation of the child's best interest. As a consequence, in an adoption contest, petitioners of a particular race would receive a head
start ....
The question thus becomes: whether statutory authority to consider race
among the factors relevant to adoption, without preference for the race of any party,
can ever be "necessary" for a determination of the child's best interest.
454 A.2d at 787. Contrary to the court's position, the reason for considering race as a factor is
to favor applicants of the same race as the child. Race must be used to give intraracial
applicants "a head start," or its use should be barred entirely. It is the constitutionality of
this "head start" that the court should have addressed.
The Drummond court, on the other hand, took a much more realistic view of the proper
role of racial factors in adoption decisions:
First, consideration of race in the child placement process suggests no racial slur
or stigma in connection with any race. It is a natural thing for children to be raised
by parents of their same ethnic background.
Finally, adoption agencies quite frequently try to place a child where he can
most easily become a normal family member. The duplication of his natural biological environment is a part of that program.
563 F.2d at 1205.
This is not to suggest that consideration of race should raise the presumption that applicants of the same race as the child prevail, for that comes dangerously close to the unconstitutional proposition that placement be decided solely on the basis of race. Rather, the
"presumption" should place a checkmark in the same-race applicants' column, which is then
weighed along with the results on the other factors (e.g., age, economic circumstances, emotional maturity, and stability) in deciding between in-race and cross-race applicants. Thus,
this writer disagrees with the concurring judge in In re R.M.G who stated that "a presumption
based solely upon the race of competing sets of would-be parents has no place in adoption
proceedings." 454 A.2d at 795 (Mack, J., concurring). Constitutional fault arises when a case
is decided solely upon a presumption based on race, not when a presumption based solely on
race is one of the factors considered. Cf 454 A.2d at 805 (Newman, CJ., dissenting) (stating
that a "preference" for intraracial adoption is permissible).
One risk of using race as a factor is that adoption agencies may place undue emphasis
upon it but obscure the grounds for decision under other, constitutionally unobjectionable
considerations. Allegations to this effect were raised by white prospective adoptive parents,
and rejected by the courts, in Drummond, supra, and in Rockefeller v. Nickerson, 36 Misc. 2d
869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1962). The court in In re R.M.G. recognized the risk that
racial factors may be used discriminatorily and required the trial court to articulate its analysis in detail. 454 A.2d at 788.
35 Comment, Matchingfor Adoption, supra note 21, at 86; Note, supra note 16, at 355, 36263; see also Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court),
which held unconstitutional a state statute precluding interracial adoption:
To justify the racial classification in Louisiana's adoption statute, the defendants must convince the Court that under all circumstances it is against the child's
best interests to have racially different parents or a racially different parent. The
defendants argue only that it cannot be regarded as unreasonable to require that a
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matching, whatever they are, to be achieved in appropriate cases
without otherwise-avoidable harm resulting to an individual child
when efforts to match would delay or block his or her adoption.
One cannot say whether matching buckled under the pressure to
make transracial placements, or whether transracial placements simply began to occur after the policy of matching became less widely
accepted. Clearly, however, transracial placement could not occur as
long as adoption and foster care agencies strictly adhered to the policy of matching.
Sixth, an insufficient number of minority homes were available
for minority children in need of adoptive placement.3 6 This problem, although not new, became increasingly acute as more minority
children came into the system, and clinical data describing the damaging aspects of both institutional and foster care became available.
The folk wisdom that blacks do not adopt has been discredited to
some extent. Black families do adopt, although frequently informally, without resort to agencies and courts. They often adopt relatives,3 7 and any disparity that may exist between black and white
adoption rates disappears when socioeconomic class is held constant.3 8 Nevertheless, a smaller percentage of black children is
adopted than white,3 9 and efforts to recruit black families have not
met the need.4°
Agency standards and practices are often blamed for the fact
that a shortage of minority homes exists. Agencies have been criti4
cized for failing to take affirmative steps to recruit black families, '
including informing the black community of the need for adoptive
child have a "natural" family, that is, racially matched parents. They do not urge,
nor could they successfully do so, that given the alternatives of institutional life,
foster home care or an interracial family home, the institutional life or foster home
care would prevail in all instances over the interracial family in serving the best
interests of the child.
36 E g., Comment, Matchingfor Adoption, supra note 21, at 72.
37 - Chimezie, TransracialAdoption of Black Children, 20 Soc. WORK 296, 297 (1975); Aldridge, Problems and Approaches to Black Adoptions, 23 FAM. COORDINATOR 407, 407 (1974).
38 When socioeconomic class is held constant, blacks adopt through agencies at a slightly
higher rate than whites. Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 279.
39 Note, supra note 16, at 336.
40 GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21, at 2; Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 279;
Wamser, supra note 33, at 418 (regarding Indian children).
41 E.g., Note, supra note 16, at 355. Grow and Shapiro found that transracially placed
black children averaged less than four months of age at placement, thus refuting the prevalent view that in-race homes are available for black infants and leading those researchers to
conclude that additional efforts are needed to recruit adoptive homes for even very young
black children. GROW & SHAPIRO II, supra note 30, at 41.
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43
families, 42 cutting the time and red tape involved in adopting,
sending black social workers into black communities, 4 4 and eliminating intrusive questions, especially from white workers, regarding fer45
tility and mental health.
Even more important than such practices are agency standards
imposed on families seeking approval as adoptive placements. Traditionally, social and economic criteria imposed by adoption agencies
have been so high that fewer black and Indian families can meet
them than white families. 46 Such standards also serve to discourage
minority families from applying in the first place, since they may
anticipate rejection.4 7 Thus, efforts to recruit minority families will
be unavailing as long as standards are imposed that minority families
are less likely to meet. This truism requires the social work profession
to make difficult determinations of which standards for prospective
adoptive families have a necessary relationship to the adoptive
child's future well-being, thus justifying retention, and which standards carry culturally and racially discriminatory effects that are not
outweighed by benefits to the child. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of
such standards in screening out minority prospective placements contributed to a rising number of transracial placements.
Finally, the change in social attitudes towards racial integration
in the 1960's contributed to the willingness of families to adopt transracially and of social workers to make transracial placements. 48 This
factor is related to, but separable from, the issue of social or integrationist motivations for adopting transracially and the impact of such
motives on the children affected. 49 Suffice it to say here that the in-

42 Aldridge, supra note 37, at 409.
43 Id
44 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 289.
45 See generally Aldridge, supra note 37, at 409.
46 H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7530, 7533 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1386]; Aldridge, supra note 37, at 409;
Chimezie, supra note 37, at 297; Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 275, 279; Palmer,
Adoption: A Plea for Realistic ConstitutionalDecisionmaking, 11 COLUm. HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 45
(1979).
47 TASK FORCE FOUR, REPORT ON FEDERAL STATE AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION, [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE FOUR REPORT], printed in S. REP. No. 597, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
45 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 597].
48 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 277-78, Marmor, supra note 30, at 202; cf
Comment, supra note 33, at 266.
49 These parents appear to adopt, in the first place, for reasons expected of any adopting
families: they love children and want a child or another child in the family but are infertile
or fearful of another pregnancy, or they are concerned about homeless children generally, or
they wish not to contribute to the worldwide population problem. GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra

note 21, at 67. Twelve percent of these parents were unable to obtain a white child and
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fluence of the early civil rights movement was to encourage integration as society's goal and, thus, to encourage transracial placement as
part of this movement.5 0 Although viewpoints later changed, 51 this
adopted a non-white child as a second choice, finding that alternative more acceptable than
childlessness. Id at 71. Although it might be expected that acceptance of a child as a second
choice would jeopardize that child's future development, Grow and Shapiro speculated that
the parents' ability to admit this fact "augurs well for their acceptance of racial differences
and their willingness to assist their child in maintaining his or her racial identity." GROW &
SHAPIRO II, supra note 30, at 41.
Motivations fundamentally more questionable, such as adopting transracially out of a
sense of guilt over the treatment of minorities in this society, have been advanced as positive
reasons for transracial adoptions. For example, one of the social workers involved in the
Indian Adoption Project, discussed in the text accompanying notes 72-74 infra, wrote:
When the Indian Adoption Project first came to the attention of the Children's
Bureau of Delaware in the fall of 1958, our reactions were essentially positive. I
believe all Americans feel a certain sense of guilt about our country's treatment of
the Indian, and so we were glad of the chance to do something concrete to offset our
nebulous sense of shame.
Davis, One Agency's Approach to the IndianAdoption Project, 40 CHILD WELFARE (no. 6) 12 (1961);
see a/so Marmor, supra note 30, at 202. On the other hand, Grow and Shapiro asked parents
who had adopted transracially what advice they would give to a friend interested in transracial adoption. "Most frequently mentioned as persons who they felt should not undertake
such adoptions were individuals who might be adopting out of guilt or a sense of duty."
GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21, at 57 (emphasis in original).
Given the significance of race in our society, transracial adoption is inevitably an affirmative social act, regardless of the parents' private motivations. Few parents, however, name a
desire to promote integration as an element moving them to adopt transracially. Id at 67.
Rather, they warn against adopting on the basis of social motivations. SIMON & ALTSTEIN I,
supra note 25, at 105-06. Social workers, too, reject the service of integration as an appropriate goal for transracial adoption. Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 284.
Parents who adopt transracially might be expected to have more "liberal" political and
social views than other adoptive parents. The available data, however, are inconclusive on
this point. Compare GROW & SHAPIRO I, sura note 21, at 237 and SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra
note 25, at 77, with D. FANSHEL, supra note 32, at 321 and Marmor, supra note 30, at 206.
Fanshel provided an interesting impressionistic view of white parents who adopted Indian
children:
Going beyond the formal data, let me identify what comes through to me ...
Repeatedly, the element that has been most noteworthy in the self-descriptions of
the subjects has been a certain independence, often self-referred to as a "stubborn
streak".. . . While far from being nonconformists, they do have an independence
of mind and do not appear easily led into accepting orientations which are basically
alien to them. This may explain their ability to accept the child who, by entrance
into their home, may place a distinctive stamp upon them and cause them to be
viewed as different from other families. It is not that they would not care what their
neighbors think, it is rather that they would not allow themselves to be guided in
their actions by such considerations.
D. FANSHEL, supra note 32, at 322. Marmor described a group of parents who adopted early
in the transracial adoption movement as sharing "common characteristics of self-confidence,
self-awareness, and what has been described as 'a light touch.'" Marmor, supra note 30, at
204.
50 See Grossman, supra note 20, at 333.
51 See text accompanying notes 57-63 inia.
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attitudinal factor was important and probably necessary to the in52
crease in transracial placements, given their social significance.
Without the convergence of at least these seven factors, the
number of transracial adoptions would not have risen to any significant level. But these forces did come together in the 1950's and
1960's, and transracial placement of both black and Indian children
in white homes began to occur with increasing frequency.
III.

Recent Policy Changes

Adoption is governed by the best interests principle, and most
adoption statutes make no mention of race. 53 Although the general
thrust of the statutes and governing principles has not changed over
the last three decades, actual practice under them has changed dramatically. 54 Transracial placements for both black and Indian children simultaneously began, peaked, and declined. The decline was
due to changing social attitudes towards the practice, stimulated by
55
growing minority group opposition.
A.

Changing Attitudes in the Social Work Profession

The social work profession, which controls the course of actual
adoption practice,5 6 states its formal views toward transracial adoption in the Standards for Adoption Service of the Child Welfare
League of America ("CWLA"), the preeminent association of adoption professionals. In 1958, before the boom in transracial adoptions,
the Standards stated that, while racial characteristics should not be
determinative in placing a child for adoption, "children placed in
adoptive families with similar racial characteristics, such as color, can
become more easily integrated into the family group and community. ' 57 The Standards also stated, however, that "[p]hysical resemblances should not be a determining factor in the selection of a home,
52 D. FANSHEL, supra note 32, at 29.
53 Comment, supra note 33, at 259. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 112-117 (McKinney 1977), which does not mention race and specifically states the best interests standard. Id
§§ 114, 115-a(4), 116(4).
54 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 266.
55 Eg., SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 2,44-45. For discussion of the views of the
National Association of Black Social Workers, see text accompanying note 62 infra.
56 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 266.
57

CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS

FOR ADOPTION SERVICE § 4.6

(1958) [hereinafter cited as CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE], quoted in Macaulay & Macaulay, supra
note 13, at 281.

[Vol. 59:503]

TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION

with the possible exception of such racialcharacteristicsas color."58 Thus,
the Standards reflected the profession's view that matched placements were generally more likely to succeed and that racial matching
was critically important.
By 1968, the CWLA had changed its position dramatically.
Again the Standards asserted that racial background should not be
determinative. But the Standards then provided:
It should not be assumed by the agency or staff members that
difficulties will necessarily arise if adoptive parents and children
are of different racial origin. .

.

. In most communities there are

families who have the capacity to adopt a child whose racial
background is different from their own. Such couples should be
encouraged to consider such a child. 59
The proviso emphasized above was also eliminated from the Standard asserting that "[p]hysical resemblances of the adoptive parents,
the child or his natural parents, should not be a determining factor in
the selection of a home. '

6°

In 1972 the National Association of Black Social Workers
("NABSW") condemned transracial adoption in terms so militant
61
that transracial adoption fell by 39 percent in a single year.
[W]e have taken the position that Black children should be
placed only with Black families whether in foster care or for
adoption. Black children belong, physically, psychologically and
culturally in Black families in order that they receive the total
sense of themselves and develop a sound projection of their future. Human beings are products of their environment and develop their sense of values, attitudes and self concept within their
family structures. Black children in white homes are cut off from
the healthy development of themselves as Black people.
Our position is based on:
1. the necessity of self-determination from birth to death, of
all Black people.
2. the need of our young ones to begin at birth to identify
with all Black people in a Black community.
3. the philosophy that we need our own to build a strong
nation.
58 Id § 4.11 (1958), quoted in Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 281 (emphasis
added).
59 Id § 4.5 (1968), quoted in Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 283-84.
60 Id § 4.9 (1968), quoted in Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 284.
61 There were 2,574 black-white adoptions in 1971 and 1,569 in 1972. By 1974 the
number was down to 1968 levels, when 733 black-white adoptions took place. Macaulay &
Macaulay, supra note 13, at 288. In 1975, there were 831 transracial adoptions. R. SIMON &
H. ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION: A FOLLOW-UP 55 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SIMON & ALTSTEIN II].
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The socialization process for every child begins at birth. Included in the socialization process is the child's cultural heritage
which is an important segment of the total process. This must
begin at the earliest moment; otherwise our children will not have
the background and knowledge which is necessary to survive in a
racist society. This is impossible if the child is placed with white
parents in a white environment.
We the participants of the workshop have committed ourselves to go back to our62communities and work to end this particular form of genocide.

Facing the condemnation of black social work professionals, the
CWLA again changed its Standards. The 1972 Standards provide:
"While we specifically affirm transracial adoptions as one means of
achieving needed permanence for some children, we recognize that
other things being equal in today's social climate, it is preferable to
'63
place a child in a family of his own racial background.
Although the CWLA Standards, perhaps somewhat defensively,
continued to approve of transracial placement for "some" children,
the organized and vociferous opposition of the NABSW had the effect noted above of dramatically reducing the number of transracial
placements made. Available evidence suggests that wholesale adop64
tion by whites of black or mulatto children has never occurred.
Current figures are hard to locate, 65 but only a small number of
transracial placements are still being made. 66 Since no data suggest
that more black homes have become available, the inevitable conclusion is that adoptable black children remain in foster homes and

institutions.

67

B.

Assimilation and Indian Placements

The history of transracial placements of Indian children, al62

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION PAPER (Apr. 1972),

quoted in SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, .upra note 25, at 50, 52.
63 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE, supra note 57, § 4.5 (1972), quoted in Chimezie, supra note
37, at 296.
64 See note 61 supra.
65 The then-named Department of Health, Education, and Welfare stopped keeping nationwide adoption figures in 1975. SIMON & ALTSTEIN II, supra note 61, at 76 n.5.
66 GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21, at 5-6; SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 4;
Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 292. On the other hand, there is some evidence that
the number of transracial adoptions may be increasing again. Jane Erickson of the Black
Child Development Institute reported to the author her impression, based upon meetings
with adoption and foster care workers in state agencies, that transracial adoption is becoming
more popular. Telephone interview with Jane Erickson (June 30, 1983).
67 Drummond Comment, supra note 21, at 151 n.143; Note, supra note 16, at 355.
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though also guided by the CWLA Standards, has been somewhat
different. Transracial placements of Indian children have been
strongly affected by congressional policy toward Indians generally.
Although that policy stressed tribal sovereignty in the early years, 68
in the 1880's the policy turned to assimilation aimed at "submerging
the distinct identity and culture of tribal Indians in the melting pot
of American society. ' 69 Part of assimilationist policy involved removing Indian children from their homes and sending them to
boarding schools operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 70 Na68 Note, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978- Provisions andPolicies, 25 S.D.L. REV. 87, 99
(1980).
69 Note, Indian Child Welfare: A JurisdictionalApproach, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1123 (1980).
70 TASK FORCE FOUR REPORT, supra note 47, at 44; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMM'N, FINAL REPORTpintedin S. REP. No. 597, supra note 47, at 39. The Indian Child
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1982), asserts that "[i]t is the sense of Congress that the
absence of locally convenient day schools may contribute to the breakup of Indian families."
Subsection (b) of § 1961 required the Secretary of the Interior to report to Congress by Nov.
8, 1980, on the feasibility of providing Indian children with schools near their homes. 25
U.S.C. § 1961(b) (1982).
The report, entitled "A Day School Opportunity for all Indian Children: A Feasibility
Study," was prepared by the National Indian Training and Research Center of Tempe, Ariz.
(A copy of the draft submitted to the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") Division of School
Facilities in Dec. of 1980 was loaned to this writer by Frank Latta, Chief of the School Facilities Staff, P.O. Box 2147, Albuquerque, N.M. 87103. His accompanying memorandum,
dated Aug. 9, 1983, indicated that the final report did not differ from the draft).
The report found that approximately 20,000 of the total 200,000 reservation Indian
school children are enrolled in BIA boarding schools or boarding dormitories, the latter of
which provide residential care for students enrolled in local public schools. Id at i (Foreword). Enrollment of Indian boarding students in BIA schools and dormitories peaked in
1971, id at 3, and the decline shows not only population decrease but also a "sustained and
definite trend" toward day schools, id at 4.
Indian children enroll in boarding schools for a variety of reasons. Unlike some estimates
that 40 to 60% of Indian children enroll in boarding schools for "social welfare" reasons ie., as a result of social services placements- the report found that only 12.1% of the elementary and high school boarding students are there for that reason. Id at 19. In addition, the
report found that 21.8% of all boarding students are there because of personal or parental
choice. The report stated, furthermore, that "Definitive data collected at the school level show a
much higherpercentage of Indian boarding students now have a day school opportunity hut attend boarding
schools on a preference basis." Id at 21 (original emphasis).
The report failed to find that lack of convenient day schools is a substantial factor in the
number of Indian children who board, the "sense of Congress" to the contrary notwithstanding. In Areas other than the Navajo, only 5% of boarding elementary school students are
there because of isolation; in the Navajo Area, the figure is 47%. Id at 20. The report found
that of the Navajo elementary students now without access to a day school, 39% are in boarding schools with a high potential for increasing day school capacity, and 27% are in boarding
schools the expansion of which would compete with public schools; only 34% have no access
to day schools in the near future due to isolation and lack of all-weather roads. Id at 62.
The report concluded that the lack of day school opportunity is almost exclusively a
problem of the Navajo Area and that boarding schools are not being misused "as a substitute
for providing adequate social services to Indian families." Id at 3, 6 (Exec. Summ.).
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tional policy has again swung toward tribal sovereignty, 7 1 but the
legacy of assimilation remains in the form of the Indian child welfare
crisis.
A study conducted in 1957 found that almost 1,000 Indian children, available for adoption, were living in foster homes and institutions. In response to this finding, the BIA and the CWLA began a
jointly sponsored demonstration project called the Indian Adoption
Project.7 2 Between 1958 and 1967, when the Project was succeeded
by the CWLA's Adoption Resource Exchange of North America
(ARENA), the Project placed 395 children in mostly non-Indian
homes.7 3 By 1972, the Project and ARENA had together placed 650
74
Indian children, again mostly in non-Indian homes.
Simultaneously, the traditional child welfare system was functioning with the combined effect noted above 75 that by the mid1970's the adoptive and foster care placement of Indian children in
'76
non-Indian 77homes had reached a level described as "alarming,
'
78
"shocking,"
and a "crisis . . . of massive proportions.
The
causes for this crisis lay in the insensitivity of the traditional child
79
welfare system to Indian culture and child-rearing practices.
In the traditional system, intervention and placement are in the
hands of social workers, social service agencies, and courts. Congress,
in its investigation of the Indian child placement crisis, found both
social workers and judges ignorant of Indian cultural patterns and,
therefore, likely to see neglect and abandonment through culturally
biased eyes.8 0 In particular, Congress charged that courts and agen71 Note, supra note 68, at 99-100.
72 Davies, Implementing the Indian Child Wefare Act, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 179, 181
(1982); see also Davis, supra note 49; Hostbjar, Social Services to Indian UnmarriedMothers, 40
CHILD WELFARE 7 (no.5) (1961); Lyslo, The Indian Adoption Project, 40 CHILD WELFARE 4
(no. 5) (1961).
73 Davies, supra note 72, at 181.
74 Goodluck & Eckstein, Indian Adoption Program: An Ethnic Approach to Child Wefare, cited
in Hearings,supra note 13, at 414,415.
75 See text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
76 Indian Child Welfare Act § 2(4), 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1982).
77 AAIA Survey, supra note 13, at 538.
78 H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 46, at 9.
79 See generally Comment, The American Indian Child-Wefare Crisis: Cultural Genocide or First
Amendment Preservation, 7 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529 (1975).
80 Two studies found that 99% of the removals of Indian children from their homes were
based on "neglect" or similar grounds. H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 46, at 10. These
grounds are the most subjective and, therefore, the most susceptible to cultural bias. Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
834 (1977); Wald, supra note 8, at 640-41.
Courts have shown sensitivity toward Indian cultural differences in a few cases. See, e.g.,
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cies do not understand the cultural differences in Indian child-rearing practices. Primarily these cultural differences revolve around the
extended family or kinship group:
An Indian child may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close, responsible members of
the family. Many social workers, untutored in the ways of Indian
family life or assuming them to be socially irresponsible, consider
leaving the child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect by the parents and thus grounds for terminating parental
rights.81
Furthermore, in the Indian culture young children are given responsibility earlier than in white society, by being left unsupervised or
being placed in charge of younger children. 82 And finally, Indian
83
children are raised more permissively than are white children.
These cultural patterns may give the appearance to a judge or social
worker that Indian parents are not providing proper supervision. In
addition to these differences in child-rearing practices, excessive use
of alcohol is often given as a reason for removal of Indian children. 4
The legislative history indicates that when rates of problem drinking
are the same for Indians and non-Indians, Indians are more likely to
lose their children because "cultural biases frequently affect decisionmaking."8' 5 Several observers, Congress stated, "have argued that
there are important cultural differences in the use of alcohol," but
that "non-Indian social workers draw conclusions about the mean86
ings of acts or conduct in ignorance of these distinctions.1
Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Carle v. Carle,
503 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1972); Alvardo v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971).
81 H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 46, at 10; see also Comment, Custody Provisions of the
Indian Child Wefare Act of 1978. The Ei on Ca/foria Dependeny Law, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 647,
652 n.31 (1979). Ironically, Professor Wald noted that foster care placement with relatives is
frequently preferred on the grounds "that relatives often are more committed to the child and
more willing to accept a child who behaves badly or exhibits special problems." Wald, supira
note 8, at 697.
82 See Comment, note 81 sura.
83 Id; see also H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 46, at 10.
84 H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 46, at 10; see also Davis, supra note 49, at 15.
85 H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 46, at 10. This observation is troubling. If the law is
being unequally applied, perhaps the appropriate solution is to remove white children from
alcoholic parents more readily rather than to stop removing Indian children from such
parents.
86 Id The committee report fails to explain what these cultural differences are or how
they justify leaving an Indian child with a parent whose drinking has impaired his or her
ability to care for the child. The report may be implying either of two possibilities: that
social workers tend to see impaired parenting ability when none exists (which fits comfortably
with Barsh's observation that white caseworkers tend to stereotype Indians as alcoholics,
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Whether or not Congress accurately cast the blame, 87 the fact of
wholesale removal of Indian children from their families and placement, generally, in non-Indian homes was well documented. The effect on the tribes was severe; loss of such large numbers of their
children threatened the very existence of tribes as identifiable cultural entities and represented "ultimately an unjustified coerced as'88
similation into the larger society.
C.

The Indian Child Wefare Act

Congress responded by passing the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978.89 The Act proceeds from the premise that the best interest of
Barsh, supra note 25, at 1295); or that acts or omissions constituting an impaired ability to
parent, sufficient to justify removal of the child from the home, differ from culture to culture.
87 The congressional reports identify state welfare agencies and courts as the "cause and
culprit" of the shockingly high rates of Indian placements. Wamser, supra note 33, at 414.
This one-dimensional approach led the committee to see the foster care system "not as a
haven for the neglected child but as a great hazard to which the child is exposed." Id at 415.
Wamser noted that the attack on state child welfare systems was not effectively answered in
the reports, id at 416, and concluded that "[t]he reports clearly evidence a bias which far
exceeds the statistical and testimonial base," id. at 416 n.26. Finally, he asserted:
The [Indian Child Welfare] Act does not contemplate such serious abuse to the
child as to require removal before remedial measures are applied. Nor does the Act
consider abandonment situations where questions of the effect of continued custody
are irrelevant. It is clearest in these provisions that the Act was drafted with the
assumption that "Indian abuse" is solely a matter of cultural perception. The lack
of child welfare expertise is evident.
Id at 426.
88 Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978" A Response to the Threat to Indian Culture Caused
by Foster andAdoptive Placements ofIndian Children, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51, 53 (1979).
89 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982). The court in In re
Guardianship of D.L.L. & C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278 (S.D. 1980), upheld the Act against several state and federal constitutional challenges: 1) that the Act unconstitutionally ceded the
state's jurisdiction over domestic relations cases to the federal courts; 2) that the Act violated
a compact with the federal government contained in the state constitution; and 3) that the
Act denied equal protection and due process to Indians by barring their access to state courts.
For more detailed discussion of the Act, see Davies, supra note 72; Guerrero, supra note
88; Wamser, supra note 33; Note, Conflct of Laws: The Plurality of Legal Systems: An Ana sis of
25 US.C §§ 1901-63, The Indian Child Welfare Act, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 333 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Conflcts Note]; Note, Legislation: Cooperation as the Ky to Efectuation of the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 387 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Legislation Note];
Note, In re DL.L. & CL.L., Minors. Ruling on the Constitutionalityof the Indian Child Welfare Act,
26 S.D.L. REv. 67 (1981); Note, supra note 68; Comment, supra note 81; Comment, The Indian
Child Welfare Act-Trbal Self-Determination Through Participationin Child Custody Proceedings,
1979 Wis. L. REv. 1202 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Tribal Self-Determination].
Consider also the approach advanced in Comment, The American Indian Child-Welfare Crisis."
CulturalGenocide or FirstAmendment Preservation, 7 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 529 (197576), in which the writer argues that a right to cultural preservation is found in the first
amendment.
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the Indian child is to stay with his or her tribe, 90 and employs jurisdictional and procedural means to achieve the substantive goal of
reducing the placements of Indian children with non-Indians. 9 ' It
allocates jurisdiction to decide a child custody matter between state
and tribal courts, with provisions "designed to limit and check the
state's ability to act in traditional child welfare areas, thereby
'92
preventing Indian children from even coming into state custody.
The Act seeks to limit the opportunity for state courts and agencies
to intervene in Indian child custody cases in the first instance, since
the substance of the criticisms of the Indian child placement process
pointed toward the negative part played by state agencies.9 3 Tribes
are given exclusive jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding 94 involving an Indian child 9 5 residing on or domiciled in the reservation, 96 except when an Indian child temporarily off the reservation is
in danger of "imminent physical damage or harm" and the state has
emergency jurisdiction under otherwise applicable state law.9 7 If an
Indian child subject to a child custody proceeding is not residing on
or domiciled within the reservation, the state court must, upon petition by the child's parent, Indian custodian, 9 or tribe, 99 transfer the
Note, supra note 68, at 115; cf.25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1982):
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the
best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in
foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and
by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family
service programs.
91 Although the primary focus of this article is on adoption, foster care placements of
Indian children pose similar threats to the tribe's existence. Provisions of the Act addressed to
foster care placement are therefore relevant.
92 Wamser, supra note 33, at 416 n.26.
93 Id; see also Barsh, supra note 25, at 1300-01.
94 Defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1982).
95 Defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1982).
96 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1982). This subsection provides an exception for cases in which
"such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law" such as Public Law
280. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). Public Law 280 permits states to assume jurisdiction
over Indian reservations in specified circumstances with (inthe statute's present version) Indian consent. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 13.1 to 13.6 (1983), which sets out procedures for a tribe over
which the state asserts any jurisdiction to reassume jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings.
97 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (1982). This provision has been characterized as a "loophole for
state placement without notice or other safeguards." Conflicts Note,supra note 89, at 350 n.61.
But see Wamser, supra note 33, at 426.
98 Defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6) (1982).
99 Defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(5) (1982).
90
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proceeding to the jurisdiction of the child's tribe, unless there is good
cause not to do so, the child's parent objects, or the tribe declines the
transfer.100 If the state court continues to have jurisdiction over a
case, the child's Indian custodian and tribe have a right to intervene
at any point in the proceeding. 0 1
Procedurally, the Act attempts to ensure that Indian cultural
and social standards will be given appropriate consideration. The
tribe and the child's parent or Indian custodian have a right to receive notice of any involuntary foster care or termination proceeding
in state court.' 0 2 Counsel must be appointed for an indigent parent
or Indian custodian, and the court has discretion to appoint counsel
for the child if that would be in the child's "best interests."' 0 3 No
foster care placement or termination of parental rights may be ordered until the court is satisfied "that active efforts have been made
to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have
proved unsuccessful."'' 0 4 Additionally, the Act establishes evidentiary standards. An order for foster care placement must be sup100 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b) (1982). This subsection has been called the "heart" of this portion
of the Act because Indian parents or custodians can transfer a state proceeding into a tribal
court and "have their cases judged by their peers and by a court system which is aware of the
socioeconomic and cultural pressures on the family." Davies, supra note 72, at 189.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs' guidelines define good cause to the contrary to include the
following cases: the child is over 12 years old and objects to the transfer; the petition to
transfer is not filed promptly after notice of the state proceeding is received and that proceeding is in an advanced stage at the time of petition; evidence necessary to decide the case
cannot be adequately presented to the tribal court without undue hardship to the parties or
witnesses; and the parents of a child over 5 years old are unavailable and the child has had
little or no contact with the tribe or its members. Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child
Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,591 (1979).
Tribal initiative in seeking to exercise jurisdiction or to intervene and participate in state
court proceedings is necessary if the Act is to succeed in reducing the number of placements of
Indian children in non-Indian homes. Tribal initiative, however, cannot overcome the objection of parents to the involvement of the tribe when a child is not domiciled or living on the
reservation. In In re S.Z., 325 N.W.2d 53 (S.D. 1982), both Indian parents stipulated that
they did not want the neglect and dependency proceeding transferred to the tribal court.
Parental rights were terminated by the state court, but the termination was set aside when the
parents argued that insufficient notice was sent to the tribe and then requested transfer of the
case. The appellate court reversed, finding notice sufficient and holding that jurisdiction of a
case involving a child not domiciled or living on the reservation cannot be transferred to a
tribal court over a knowing, voluntary parental veto. See also In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.,
231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168 (1982).
101 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1982).
102 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1982).
103 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1982); see In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981) (holding
that appointment of counsel for an indigent Indian parent is mandated by the Act); 25
C.F.R. § 23.13 (1983) (designating who pays for the attorney's services).
104 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1982).
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ported by clear and convincing evidence "that continued custody
. . .by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child."' 1 5 And an order terminating parental rights must also be supported by evidence beyond a
10 6
reasonable doubt that such damage is likely to occur.
The most important procedural provisions of the Act are place10 7
ment preferences. In the absence of good cause to the contrary,
and unless the child's tribe varies the statutory preferences, 10 8 preference for adoptive placement of an Indian child is given to a member
of the child's extended family, 10 9 other members of the child's
tribe, n ° and other Indian families"' in that order. 112 Preference for

foster care or pre-adoptive placement is given to a member of the
child's extended family; a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the child's tribe; an Indian foster home licensed or approved
by an authorized non-Indian agency; and an institution approved by
a tribe or operated by an Indian organization. 1 3 Thus, the Act tries
to'ensure that an Indian child is placed within the Indian community whenever that is possible, but without in every case precluding
114
placement with a non-Indian family.
The tribe may not be able to prevent placement elsewhere if the
parent objects to tribal involvement. In In re Adoption of Baby Boy
L. ,115 for example, the non-Indian mother of a part-Indian illegitimate child consented to his adoption by specified individuals and
adamantly resisted tribal intervention in the proceedings. In light of
her position, the appellate court held that the trial court's refusal to
allow intervention was harmless error, if error at all, since the mother
promised to revoke her consent and retake ciustody (as the Act al105 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1982).
106 25 U.S.C. § 1912(o (1982); cf.Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
107 Good cause for placement contrary to the preference list is defined in Recommended
Guidelines for State Courts-Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 24,000, 24,002
(1979).
108 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1982).
109 Defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (1982). The fieed for this provision is illustrated by
E.A. v. Stateex re. C.A. & V.A., 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981), in which Eskimo children were
placed for adoption following termination of their mother's parental rights without any information being given by the state agency to their grandparents. The case arose before the
effective date of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
110 Defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(5) (1982).
111 Defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) (1982).
112 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982).
113 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1982).
114 H.R. REP. No. 1386, .wpra note 46, at 23.
115 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168 (1982).
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lows1 16) if the Act's placement preferences were followed.
Although it is too early to gauge the success of the Indian Child
Welfare Act in reducing placements of Indian children in non-Indian
homes," 7 there is evidence that jurisdiction and placement preferences are not enough." 8 One reason for the heavy involvement of
state courts and agencies in the first place was the lack of child protective services operated by tribal governments."19 The Act's success
ultimately depends, therefore, upon development of Indian child and
family programs designed to prevent the initial breakup of Indian
families and to license Indian foster and adoptive homes, since without Indian facilities children will continue to be placed in the nonIndian environments Congress found so detrimental.
The tribes cannot play a role in developing programs designed
116 See text accompanying notes 226-31 infra.
117 Cases such as In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981), raise doubts. The state
petitioned for custody of an Indian child residing off the reservation, alleging neglect and
abuse by the mother. When the tribe requested transfer of jurisdiction, the agency indicated
that it would oppose transfer "unless the Tribal Court's 'plans for the disposition of the case'
were first stated." Id at 1315. Clearly, the agency was attempting to control the substance of
the tribal court's action and, by its effort to exercise prior approval, the agency dramatically
illustrated the cultural biases that made the Act necessary. The dissent to In re M.E.M. suggests that the trial court may have been similarly culpable. The dissenting judge stated that
the trial court refused to transfer jurisdiction because it was not satisfied (apparently on socioeconomic grounds) with the persons on the reservation to whom the court expected custody
would be given. Id at 1318-19 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
Cases interpreting the Act restrictively also raise doubts about its ultimate effectiveness.
In In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980), a part-Indian child was informally placed with
her Indian parental grandparents by her non-Indian mother. The grandparents refused to
return the child upon the mother's request and obtained a temporary custody order from the
tribal court without notice to the mother. The mother filed a habeas corpus petition in state
court, which then ordered the grandparents to return the child to her mother. The Montana
Supreme Court vacated, holding that the tribal court had jurisdiction. On the mother's petition for rehearing, the Court remanded for the lower court to develop a record regarding
jurisdiction.
In the course of its opinion remanding the case, the Montana Supreme Court held that
the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply because "[t]he issue here is not which foster or
adoptive home or institution will best 'reflect the unique values of Indian culture. ... .'
Rather, the present case involves an internal family dispute between the mother and the
paternal grandparents over the custody of the child." Id at 126. Because the mother was not
an Indian, however, the dispute did implicate the child's identity as an Indian and the future
of the tribe. To conclude that the Act is intended only "to preserve Indian culture values
under circumstances in which an Indian child is placed in a foster home or other protective
institution," id at 125, is to read the Act too narrowly. Compare A.B.M. v. M.H. & A.H., 651
P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982), cert. deniedsub nom. Hunter v. Maxie, 103 S. Ct. 1893 (1983), finding
the Act applicable to a dispute between an Indian mother and prospective adoptive parents,
who were her sister and brother-in-law, and expressly declining to follow Berelson. Id at 1173
n.6.
118 Legislation Note, supra note 89, at 387, 388, 393.
119 Barsh, supra note 25, at 1293.

[Vol. 59:503]

TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION

to assist Indian children and families, for which the Act provides, 20
without adequate funding.' 21 Ironically, the money allocated for
these programs may not be adequate. 22 An even greater flaw is the
lack of a monitoring and reporting system that would indicate
whether the Act effectively decreases the transracial placement of Indian children. 123 And finally, although the success stories of efforts to
reunite children in foster care with their biological parents is not altogether discouraging, 24 such programs have generally had little
success. 125
IV. Competing Interests Within the "Best Interests" Standard
Hidden in the maze of the transracial placement issue, and the
child welfare system that deals with it, are several groups of competing interests and values. All of them are encompassed by the best
interests rubric. These competing interests can be isolated, however,
120 25 U.S.C. §§ 1931-1934 (1982). For administrative regulations pertaining to these
grants, see 25 C.F.R. § 23.21 to 23.81 (1982).
121 Congress recognized that jurisdictional and preference provisions were insufficient if
unaccompanied by "adequately funded, tribally controlled family development programs."
S. REP. No. 597, supra note 47, at 12. Furthermore, the committee specifically found that a
national child welfare bill then before Congress was inadequate to replace the ICWA because
Indian children need specially tailored programs.
122 The programs have been funded for the past three years at $5.6 million, $9.6 million,
and $9.7 million. Telephone interview with Zokan-Vellas Reyes of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (June 27, 1983). Nonetheless, these funding levels have been called inadequate. Davies, sup'ra note 72, at 196; Wamser, supra note 33, at 418. Professor Wald has argued that the
lack of services
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that we ought -not to remove children or
terminate parental rights unless the service system is adequately funded. The prob-'
lem must be considered from the child's perspective as well. Are we prepared to say
that an endangered child should not be removed because the state has not provided
services that might have kept the family intact, when such services do not exist? Are
we going to deny a child in foster care a permanent home because the state has not
helped her parents regain custody, thereby consigning the child to impermanent
foster care?
These alternatives are unacceptable.
Wald, npra note 8, at 696 n.269.
123 The Bureau of Indian Affairs maintains records required by 25 U.S.C. § 1951 to enable an Indian child to locate his or her tribe and become eligible for the rights and benefits
oftribal membership. The Bureau has no records that would indicate whether the incidence
of transracial placement of Indian children is diminishing in response to the Indian Child
Welfare Act. Telephone interview with Zokan-Vellas Reyes of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(June 27, 1983). Apparently the success or failure of the Act cannot be evaluated unless
independent researchers undertake to collect the necessary empirical data.
124 Davies reports that the Blackfoot have significantly reduced the number of children in
placement by focusing child protective services on preventive treatment. Davies, supra note
72, at 195.
125 Wald, supra note 8, at 663, 665.
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and the best interest test can thereby be given some content that will
foster greater analytical clarity in making decisions in transracial
adoption cases. These interests can be grouped as those belonging to
child welfare agencies, minority groups, and the affected children
themselves.
A.

Interests of Child We/fare Agencies

The institutional interests of child welfare agencies, whether
state or private, are among both the most powerful and arguably the
least important of all the competing interests.
Only someone unfamiliar with the child placement system can
be unaware that agencies are very powerful in child placement matters. 26 The system allows agencies a great deal of discretion, and
courts often defer to the views expressed by agencies in specific
cases. 127 In its least defensible aspect, this agency power reflects a
purely self-centered institutional interest in continuing to play the
role of a power-broker within the child welfare system. Their monopoly over the adoption system, reflected in social workers' criticisms of independent adoptive placements 128 and in a few states by
statutes prohibiting such placements, 29 could be viewed as a reflection of such empire-building. Cases in which agencies have taken
positions arguably detrimental to the interests of affected children
may also be best explained as efforts to maintain the agencies' power
30
to decide.
126 Eg., Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 273; Drummond Comment, supra note 21,
at 151; Note, supra note 16, at 353-54.
127 But see In re Adoption of Baker, 117 Ohio App. 26, 185 N.E.2d 51 (1962), in which the
trial court ignored the agency's recommendation and reached an objectionable result in the
process. A white husband and Japanese-American wife sought to adopt their English and
Puerto Rican foster child. The trial court denied the adoption although five other couples
had refused foster placement because of the child's mixed nationality, the agency unqualifiedly recommended that adoption be allowed, and there were no appearances in opposition. The appellate court reversed:
As we view it, the only alternative, if the judgment be affirmed, is to have the child
remain an illegitimate orphan to be reared in an institution. Orphanges [sic] are all
well and good but they do not provide a real home with the attendant care, love
and affection incident to the relation of parent and child. With all due respect for
the learned trial judge's conclusion, we differ therewith ....
Id at 28, 185 N.E.2d at 53.
128 See R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 621 (1978), and sources cited therein;
Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 270.
129 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-63 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904 (1975); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 199.470 (1982); RI. GEN. LAWS § 15-71-1 (1981).
130 Child placement agencies, for instance, may define the foster relationship in contractual terms and require the foster parents to agree not to try to adopt their foster child. See,
e.g., In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959),
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Undoubtedly such an interest exists, but as a matter of articulated policy, agencies (and probably any self-respecting child welfare
worker) justify their role in terms of expertise. In other words, social
workers and social agencies are allowed a great deal of discretion,
and deference is given to their decisions, because they are the experts
13 1
in the field of foster care and adoption:
In theory, the authority to approve petitions for any type of
adoption is judicial power. In practice, power is exercised by the
social work profession in the name of the adoption agency. Historically, the courts have recognized that they do not possess the
requisite evaluative expertise and have relegated to social work
the task of determining whether potential adoptive parents are fit
to serve in that capacity, but they have retained their (seldom
used) prerogative to deny an agency's recommendation. Thus, in
most cases, it was the quality of social work's assessment of what
was deemed to be in a child's best interests, as recommended to
and interpreted by the court, that marked the legal status of
adoption, specifically of transracial adoption. The
court's posi32
tion was one of response rather than initiation.
Discretion is not unlimited; it is ostensibly confined by the requirement that placement decisions be made in the child's best interests.' 33 Yet the best interests test does not impose any genuine
which is the best-known case illustrating this point. Such agreements may or may not be
enforced by courts. CompareJewish Child Care and Huey v. Lente, 85 N.M. 585, 514 P.2d 1081
(Ct. App. 1973) (holding that efforts by foster parents who had signed an agreement not to try
to adopt violated both the agreement and their fiduciary obligation to the biological mother
and that the order terminating her parental rights be reversed and the case remanded), rev'd
on other grounds, 85 N.M. 597, 514 P.2d 1093 (1973), with Knight v. Deavens, 259 Ark. 45, 531
S.W.2d 252 (1976) (denying specific performance of agreement by foster parents not to attempt to adopt, but refusing to declare the agreement void). Apart from the issue of enforceability, these agreements represent a frame of reference explaining why children are removed
from foster homes despite the emotional ties that have formed. Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 837 (1977); Wald, supra note 8, at 699; see also In re Harshey, 45
Ohio App. 2d 97, 341 N.E.2d 616 (1975) (reversing trial court, which refused adoption because it would allow the adopting parents to circumvent the agency's waiting list).
131 Social work expertise in child welfare matters may be a myth. Not only are caseloads
and staff turnover high, Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 272, 293, but Professor
Wald reported that most workers are young and inexperienced, with little college or in-service
training. Wald, supra note 8, at 640. Even more troubling, however, is his report "that even
very experienced social workers, given a specific set of facts, come to quite different conclusions regarding the need for removal [of the child from his or her home] in the given case."
Id
132 'SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 17-18 (footnotes omitted).
133 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 860 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) ("This is not to say that under the law of New York foster children are
the pawns of the State, who may be whisked from family to family at the whim of state
officials. . . . But the protection that foster children have is simply the requirement of state
law that decisions about their placement be determined in the light of their best interests.").
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limitation. It is notoriously vague, 134 and that vagueness is an invita135
tion to courts to defer to social workers' views.
If social work professionals indeed have an expertise worthy of
deference, the course of transracial adoption history becomes difficult
136
to explain. First there is the vacillation of CWLA Standards:
How could professionals, whose control over adoption process
rests on their standing as experts, swing so widely in their judgments about transracial adoption in the short space of twenty
years? In 1957, it was almost unthinkable to allow whites to
adopt blacks; in 1968, transracial adoption was the progressive
policy enshrined in the Child Welfare League of America's Standards; in 1972, transracial adoption was cultural genocide; and,
in 1977, while transracial adoption is generally disapproved by
it all depends on where you are and whom you
the professionals,
137
ask.
Social workers, despite their central importance to the transracial
placement issue, have shown a marked tendency to permit their professional judgment to be influenced by shifting political winds. Not
only have their formal professional opinions, embodied in the CWLA
Standards, been malleable, so also has actual practice, reflected in
the ebb and flow of transracial placement's history. Thus, the profession may have defaulted on the question of expertise and lost any
credible claim that its determinations should be granted special deference in placement decisions.
B. Interests of Minority Groups
Minority groups have two identifiable interests separable from
interests of the affected child. They have, first, an interest in deciding whether children of that minority group are adopted by nongroup members, and second, an interest in maintaining their racial
and cultural identity.
Blacks and Indians, as groups, arguably have an interest akin to
an inherent racial right to decide the fate of their children, without
134 Despite justice Stewart's optimistic view of the limitations on discretion imposed by
the best interests standard, see note 133 supra, he joined Justice Blackmun's opinion for the
majority in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982), which observed that "[p]ermanent
neglect proceedings employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge." Justice Blackmun cited Smith as authority for
this proposition. See also H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 46, at 19; Wald, supra note 8, at 64950.
135 See Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 269.
136 See text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
137 Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 294.
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regard to the substantive merits of those decisions. 138 On this point,
however, the racial group interests of blacks and Indians need to be
distinguished. Blacks, on the one hand, do not appear to have
reached a consensus on the issue of transracial adoption for children
who lack realistic opportunities for in-race placement in the immediate future. 139 Indians, on the other hand, seem to agree that transracial adoption is unacceptable, if the legislative history to the Indian
Child Welfare Act is to be believed.140 Certainly the policy of the
Act, achieved primarily through the allocation of jurisdiction, is to
41
let Indian people decide Indian child welfare questions.'
The second interest of blacks and Indians is in their very continuity as identifiable groups with cultural patterns that set them
apart from other groups in society. Recognition of minority groups'
interests in cultural identity is a political stance, but it probably reflects values shared by minorities and the white majority alike. Because transracial adoption removes children from their racial and
ethnic groups, it poses some threat to the groups' interests in
continuity.
Recognition of this interest is justified because both national
and international policy embrace the value of continued racial and
138 "Just as natural parents take a major role in decision-making when a child lacks the
necessary experience or knowledge, so it seems appropriate that blaeks collectively as parents
should speak for the black child in matters touching transracial adoption." Chimezie, supra
note 37, at 297-98; see also D. FANSHEL, supra note 32, at 341-42:
It is my belief that only the Indian people have the right to determine whether their
children can be placed in white homes. . . . Indian leaders may decide that some
children may have to be saved through adoption even though the symbolic significance of such placements is painful for a proud people to bear. On the other hand,
even with the benign outcomes reported here, it may be that Indian leaders would
rather see their children share the fate of their fellow Indians rather than lose them
in the white world. It is for the Indian people to decide.
139 Chimezie, supra note 37, at 298; Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 287.
140 S. REP. No. 597, supra note 47, at 12.
Fanshel cautioned that although Indian representatives assented to the adoption of Indian children by whites through the Indian Adoption Project, these assents were given over a
decade ago and tribal attitudes may have changed. D. FANSHEL, supra note 32, at 25, 341.
Some insight into these assents can be gleaned from Hostbjar, however:
We need to recognize here that members of the group [ie., Indian tribe] can
accept interpretation regarding children's needs, and we have not had strong negative reactions or concern regarding the children who have been released for adoption outside of the group. However, if we ask one of the members how he feels
about this, his initial reaction is usually disapproval.
Hostbjar, supra note 72, at 9. It appears, then, that even assents to transracial adoption given
a decade ago were given only because of the tribes' recognition of the even less desirable
alternatives and, all too possibly, only after "interpretation" by white workers.
141 See text accompanying notes 92-101 supra;see also, Comment, TribalSef-Delermrinalion,
supra note 89, at 1210.
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ethnic diversity. National policy is clearly seen in the Indian Child
Welfare Act, which seeks to preserve the tribes and asserts the importance of children to tribal preservation.142 And international policy,
contained in the Report of the International Law Commission to the
United Nations, condemns the intentional destruction of racial and
ethnic groups and explicitly recognizes the importance to these
43
groups of maintaining contact with their children.
It is doubtful that transracial adoption of black children was
ever a "diabolical scheme" to pass thousands of black children into
the white community, as some opponents of transracial adoption apparently thought.144 Although the NABSW charged that transracial
adoption of black children amounted to cultural genocide, 145 the
charge in this context is simply specious-so few black children have
been placed in white homes 146 that no genuine threat exists to the
147
continuance of blacks as a cultural, racial, or ethnic group.
The former federal policy of assimilation and termination, however, supports a contrary conclusion where Indians are concerned.
The rate of placement of Indian children has been so high 148 that
Indians as an identifiable group have been genuinely threatened.
The interest of Indians in maintaining their cultural identity is thus
weightier than that of blacks in the context of transracial adoption.
The cultural identities of blacks and Indians are equally valuable,
142 Among the findings in the Indian Child Welfare Act are the findings "that Congress
. . . has assumed the responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and
their resources" and "that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence
and integrity of Indian tribes than their children." 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2)-(3) (1982).
143 Article 2 of the International Law Commission's Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind states:
The following acts are offenses against the peace and security of mankind:
(10) Acts by the authorities of a State or by private individuals committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group as such, including:
(v) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Report of the International Law Commission, 35th Sess., to the General Assembly, 38 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14-15, U.N. Doc. A/38/10 (1983).
While transracial adoption does not constitute an offense because of the intent requirement, the policy recognizing that discrete racial and ethnic groups have an interest in continuity is clear.
144 SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 62, at 3.
145 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
146 See note 61 supra.
147 This issue is analytically separable from the question of the impact on the individual
child of loss of cultural identity, which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 174-210
infia .
148 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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but the threat posed by transracial adoption to this group interest is
much more serious in the case of Indians.
C. Interests of the Individual Child
Ultimately, the individual child is most directly and strongly affected by a decision to make a transracial placement or to leave him
or her to whatever alternative the system can provide. Given the
paramount importance of a family in children's emotional development,1 49 one identifiable interest of affected children is placement in
a stable and permanent family setting. Transracial adoption provides such a setting. The issue of transracial placement, however,
must be addressed in the context of the available alternatives, 5 0 and
possible detrimental consequences of transracial placement to the individual child must be weighed against the advantages of the stable
family that transracial placement would provide.
Transracially-placed children may face unique stresses, such as
149 See text accompanying notes 14-24 supra.
150 Professor Goldstein and Drs. Freud and Solnit have suggested the use of a least detrimental alternative standard, rather than the best interests standard, in the general context of
child placement. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 53-64. The least detrimental alternative standard could highlight for courts and social workers that their task is not to
search for some nonexistent "ideal" solution. Comment, supra note 20, at 767. Rather, they
should pragmatically examine the choices immediately and actually available, recognizing
the limitations and risks of each, and choose the one that poses the least risk of harm to the
child.
Failure to approach the problem in these terms led to the agency's decision in Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977)
(en banc), cerl. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). The agency removed a two-and-a-half year-old
mixed-race child from the white foster home in which he had lived since his second month,
because "what we're trying to do is look at the child and. . . what would be best for him for
his whole life." Brief for Appellant at 61. He was placed with black adoptive parents in the
belief that they could help him develop the "survival skills" necessary for later dealing with
problems caused by his race. The workers should have viewed the issue in terms of what
alternative was least detrimental, rather than as an opportunity to create an ideal world for
the child. The agency's actions and the courts' decisions allowing the child's removal have
been criticized. See Palmer, supra note 46; Dnimmond Comment, supra note 21.
In Rockefeller v. Nickerson, 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the court
apparently ignored the alternatives for the child and denied efforts by white foster parents to
adopt their black foster child. The welfare department had rejected their application because, the court found, they already had three natural and two adopted children, they were
not infertile, their second adopted child had been adopted recently, and the mother intended
to continue to work outside the home. The court decided that the application had not been
rejected on the grounds of unwritten departmental policy to prohibit transracial placements,
as the parents alleged. Apparently the child was institutionalized and had no other prospects
for adoption, although these facts do not appear from reading the opinion. For this reason,
the case has been severely criticized. See Grossman, supra note 20, at 313; Comment, supra
note 33, at 261; Comment, supra note 20, at 752. If adoption is better for children than
institutionalization, this decision clearly failed to serve the child's best interests.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[19841

the probability of being the only nonwhite child in their neighborhood,' 5 ' and possible rejection by their peers 52 and the wider community. 53 The primary concern, however, is that transracial
placement is in itself damaging to the affected children. The possible
damage posed to the transracially-placed child takes two forms, one
"internal," or emotional and psychological maladjustments, and the
15
other "external," or destroyed racial and cultural identity.

4

If

transracial placements injure children in either of these ways, then
such placements are not "successful" 155 and, arguably, should not
occur.
151 Simon and Altstein, as well as Grow and Shapiro, found that most whites who adopt
transracially live in all-white or predominately-white neighborhoods. SIMON & ALTSTEIN I,
supra note 25, at 77-78. But Grow and Shapiro also found no correlation between racial
composition of the neighborhood and any of their measures of the child's adjustment, although parents living in integrated neighborhoods were more likely to report that they were
satisfied with the adoption. GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21, at 166-67.
152 Compare Chimezie, supra note 37, at 300 (asserting that these possibilities are "documented in the literature," but citing only the popular press) and Comment, Tribal Seif-Determination, supra note 89, at 1204-05, with Grossman, supra note 20, at 330 and Note, supra note 16,
at 361.
Grow and Shapiro found that parents reporting that their children had experienced cruelty from other children also reported significantly fewer problems in relationships with other
children. The researchers offered two possible explanations for this paradox. On the one
hand, these parents, who were most prepared to deal with race problems, might be less likely
to deny the existence of such incidents and might be more likely to encourage their children
to report them. On the other hand, parents whose children have been treated cruelly by
other children might have a defensive need to stress that their child's relationships with other
children are, nevertheless, good. GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21, at 177-79.
153 This possibility has been repeatedly acknowledged, Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F.
Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court); Chimezie, supra note 37, at 299-300;
Grossman, supra note 20, at 329, but it may be nothing more than speculation. Simon and
Altstein found that parents who adopted transracially perceived their friends and neighbors
"as having little interest in or reaction to their adopted child," and only 10% reported negative feedback concerning the adoption. SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 95. Similarly,
the Macaulays stated that "two of the most common problems transracial parents reported
were the discomfort of facing attributions of sainthood and moral superiority and the childraising problem of gushing relatives and neighbors." Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at
285-86 (citation omitted).
154 The court in In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 787 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982), similarly elaborated components of "identity" relevant to adopted children: "(1) a sense of 'belonging' in a
stable family and community; (2) a feeling of self-esteem and confidence; and (3) 'survival
skills' that enable the child to cope with the world outside the family. One's sense of identity,
therefore, includes perceptions of oneself as both an individual and a social being."
155 It is, of course, impossible to define "success" or to measure whether it is accomplished,
or to define "cultural identity" or to determine whether it is lost. See GROW & SHAPIRO I,
supra note 21, at 89-90; Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 295-96. Any researcher
investigating transracial adoption must face this problem, and all of the available data can be
attacked on this point. See, e.g., In re R.M.G. 424 A.2d 776, 797 n.5 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982)
(Newman, C.J., dissenting). These are the only data we have, however, and must be relied on
for whatever they are worth. But see Chimezie, supra note 37, at 300-01.
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When stated so simply, however, the issue is misleading. If such
damage does occur, one might argue that only in-race placements
should be made, or in other words, that transracial placement is second best. All the commentators appear to agree that in-race placement is better for children, 156 despite data suggesting that
transracially adopted children adjust as well as in-racially adopted
children.157 In-race placements have advantages in that they avoid
the problems of cultural identity and emotional adjustment that inhere in transracial placements, and provide the benefits of matching
and placement in a stable family environment. The fact is, however,
that in-race homes are not available in sufficient numbers. 158 Thus
arguments about the preferability of in-race as opposed to transracial
placement are irrelevant.159
The alternative to transracial adoption for available children is
not in-racial adoption but non-adoption, i.e., continued institutional
or foster care. The pertinent question, therefore, is whether children
60
are better served by transracial adoption or by no adoption at all.'
Evaluating the adjustment of transracially adopted children
provides only half the answer. The other half lies in a comparison of
that emotional adjustment with the emotional adjustment of nonadopted children. If such a comparison were to establish that transracially-placed children experience better emotional adjustment than
children raised in foster homes and institutions, then the case for
transracial placement would be decidedly advanced. Evidence on
both halves of this question is available. The weight of clinical data
and psychological opinion supports the conclusion that foster care
and institutionalization are seriously detrimental to the emotional
development of affected children, 16' and evidence is available concerxiing the adjustment of blacks and Indians raised in white
homes. 62 No study, however, directly compares the emotional ad156 D. FANSHEL, supra note 32, at x (Foreword by Joseph H. Reid, Executive Director of
the Child Welfare League of America, stating the League's position); SIMON & ALTSTEIN I,
supra note 25, at 44; Chimezie, supra note 37, at 296.
157 See notes 167-68 infra and accompanying text.
158 See text accompanying notes 36-47 supra.
159 But see SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 49; R. McRoy & L. ZURCHER, TRANSRACIAL AND INRACIAL ADOPTEES: THE ADOLESCENT YEARS (1983).
Similarly, the relevant comparison is not between children adopted in-racially and those
not adopted at all. Data establishing the importance of a stable and nurturing family, see text
accompanying notes 14-24 supra, are sufficiently persuasive that no doubt exists about the
relative merits of in-racial adoption versus non-adoption.
160 But see Chimezie, supa note 37, at 297-98.
161 See text accompanying notes 14-24 supra.
162 See text accompanying notes 167-72 infia.
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justment of transracially adopted and non-adopted children in a controlled fashion, so conclusions about the relative benefits or
detriments of transracial adoption vis-a-vis non-adoption are necessarily inferential and intuitive.
Despite the fact that studies of transracially-adopted children
have not drawn comparisons with a control group of non-adopted
children and are thus of limited utility,

63

they provide some insight

into the major areas of emotional adjustment and cultural identity.
Only three such studies have been made, one focusing on black children adopted by white parents,' 64 one on Indian children adopted by
white parents, 165 and one on both.166
The studies indicate that transracially adopted children, generally speaking, experience good emotional development. Grow and
Shapiro found that twenty-three percent of the families in their study
were "in trouble," 167 and that race was a factor in those problems for
only about half of them. 68 Thus, the child's racial identity was a
factor contributing to the researchers' categorization of the family as
"in trouble" in less than thirteen percent of the families studied. Although this figure is in itself fairly low, two caveats must be added.
First, although race may have been a factor in the problems experienced within the family, no post-adoption difficulties can be viewed
independently of the foster care received by the child before adop163 The dissenting opinion in In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 797 n.5 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982)
(Newman, CJ., dissenting), catalogues other shortcomings of the available empirical
research.
164 GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21. But see R. McRoY & L. ZURCHER, SUpra note 159,
at 138.
165 D. FANSHEL, supra note 32.
166 SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25. These researchers did a follow-up study seven
years later. SIMON & ALTSTEIN II, supra note 61.
167 Grow and Shapiro combined the scores their study families achieved on 15 different
measures, including test scores, teacher evaluations, and interviewer ratings, into a single
score for overall success. On the basis of the combined results they identified 29 of their 125
families as "in trouble," giving an overall "success" rate of 77%. This rate, the researchers
found, is approximately the same as the success rate for traditional white infant adoptions
and for nontraditional racially-mixed and older-child adoptions. GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra
note 21, at 102-03, 224-25.
Although Simon and Altstein's study was not directly concerned with the success of
transracial adoptions, SIMON & ALTSTEIN II, supra note 61, at 28-29, those researchers identified only 25 of the 133 families participating in their follow-up study (19%) as problem families. (This characterization was based on parents' satisfaction with the adoption and their
view that negative elements outweighed the positive.). Id. at 28-29; see also D. FANSHEL, supra
note 32, at 322-23, 339.
168 GROW & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21, at 102; Sf R. McRoY & L. ZURCHER, supra note
159, at 117-23.
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tion.169 Minority children spend longer periods of time in foster care

and experience more frequent moves. 170 The social work profession's
reluctance to make transracial placements and the reputation of minority children as hard to place' 7' also contribute to the likelihood of
longer placements. These children may be expected, therefore, to
carry emotional scars from that experience into their adoptive
placements.
Second, there is some evidence that minority children in general
experience problems with self-esteem and emotional adjustment due
to the effects of prejudice and racism. 72 To the extent that these
problems persist despite the development of an increasingly positive
sense of group identity and pride within minority groups, then evidence that race is a factor contributing to the problems of adoptive
families in trouble is less informative than it otherwise might be. In
other words, if a transracially placed child is experiencing problems
related to his or her racial identity, we cannot know whether these
problems were caused by the transracial placement or whether the
173
child would experience them anyway.
There is a relationship, however, between the race of the adopted child and the
proportion of parents who acknowledged that they had had difficulties with the
child. For example, 18 percent of the parents who had adopted a white child as
their first adopted child said that they had had problems with him or her, in contrast to 39 and 47 percent of the parents who had adopted black and Indian or
Asian children, respectively. But among all three categories,the explanationmost often given
for the diftulties was problems-haddeveloped as a result of thefoster care the child hadreceived
prior to the adoption and not because of the child's race.
SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 89 (emphasis added).
170 See note 13 sura.
171 Aldridge argued that agencies have projected their own failure to find permanent
homes for black children onto the black community and the children themselves by labeling
them hard to place. Aldridge, supra note 37, at 407. Apparently, Indian children are no
longer hard to place, D. FANSHEL, supra note 32, at 44, quoting letter of Edgar Fautsenheiser,
social worker for Bureau of Indian Affairs in Aberdeen; SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25,
at 174. Although these authorities do not so indicate, apparently they mean only that homes
can be found for Indian children, not that these homes are in-race placements. This reading
reconciles Wamser's apparently contradictory report that the New Mexico agency could not
find enough Indian homes despite considerable efforts. Wamser, supra note 33, at 418.
172 See H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 46, at 12; SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at
126, 148, 161; Grossman, supra note 20, at 332; cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483, 494 (1954) ("To separate them [black school children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.').
173 The court in Miller v. Berks County Children & Youth Servs. (In re Davis), 465 A.2d
614 (Pa. 1983), was apparently unaware of this possibility. In that case, an elderly white
couple, the Millers, sought to become foster parents of Shane, a mixed-race illegitimate child.
The Millers had raised Shane's mother, Betty, since she was abandoned on their farm by her
black migrant-worker parents at the age of two. Shane lived with the Millers most of his first
four-and-one-quarter years, and remained in contact with them thereafter. When he was
169
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Critics of transracial adoption are concerned that affected children will lose their identity as blacks or Indians and suffer adjustment problems as a result. They argue that white parents, no matter
how hard they try, simply cannot provide an environment in which
74
the child can retain or develop his or her black or Indian identity.1
Many commentators are ready to concede that transracially placed
children may experience identity problems, I75 but the little available
evidence is not clear-cut. Grow and Shapiro found that one-fourth of
the children in their study had some negative feelings about being
black, 76 but the researchers provided no data comparing that finding to black children of similar age raised in black families. 177 Adoptive parents reported to those researchers that one-third of the
children were aware of their black heritage and were proud of it, but
forty-four percent of the parents either did not know their child's
attitude toward his or her black heritage or reported that the child
was indifferent toward it. 178
In their 1972 study, Simon and Altstein found that while seventy-nine percent of parents who had adopted a white child said that
the child considered himself or herself white, only thirty-two percent
of parents who had adopted a black child and thirty-six percent of
parents who had adopted an Indian, Asian, or other child said that
the child identified with that group. Thirty-eight and thirty percent
of parents who had adopted a black or Indian, respectively, said the
child was too young to have acquired a racial identity, but only seven
percent of parents adopting a white child said so. I 79 The researchers

concluded that parents adopting non-white children were less sure of
their children's racial identity than parents adopting white children,
five-and-one-half, Betty's husband murdered her. The state agency planned to place Shane
with black foster parents, rather than with the Millers. Id. at 617. The trial court failed to
consider race in ruling against the Millers, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the
error harmless, given that consideration of the racial factor would support the judgment below. Id. at 622. In the course of discussing race, the court referred to evidence that Betty was
biased against blacks and had low self-esteem, which a caseworker attributed to Betty's lack
of racial identity. Id. at 628. Neither the court nor, apparently, the witnesses noted that these
problems cannot be conclusively linked to Betty's childhood in a white home.
174 SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 2-3.
175 E., Comment, supra note 20, at 766.
176 GROW & SHAPIRO I,supra note 21, at 188.
177 Id. at 181-82. McRoy and Zurcher provided such a comparison, with nonrandomlyselected study groups, and found that transracially-adopted black children who lacked everyday interaction with black people were less likely to develop a positive black racial identity
than inracially-adopted or transracially-adopted black children who had such interaction. R.
McRoY & L. ZURCHER, supra note 159, at 124-37.
178 Id. at 188.
179 SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 100.
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despite the fact that the age ranges of the white and non-white children did not differ. The researchers' follow-up study in 1979 showed
a major change in this respect, however. Seven years later, none of
the parents reported that the child was too young to have developed
a racial identity, and only three percent said that they did not know
with which racial group their children identified.180 The parents reported that forty-five percent of the children identified themselves as
black, and twenty-three percent held a mixed black-white identity. 8 1
The follow-up study showed that sixty percent more parents felt that
their children perceived themselves as black or partly black at the
82
time of the second study than seven years earlier.
Simon and Altstein also found that the majority of adoptive parents were trying to foster identity with the minority group of which
their children were a part. In 1972, seventy-five percent of the parents reported that they made such efforts, chiefly through bringing
books, toys, music, and the like into their homes and by providing
opportunities for their child to play with other non-white children.183
A third of the families did little or nothing in this regard, however,
and twelve percent stated that "[t]heir main objective is to bring the
child into their life-style" and that they intended "to live as they
8I 4
would have if they had not adopted a child of a different race."'
The results were much the same in 1979.185
Obviously some of these children will experience cultural confusion or a complete loss of black or Indian identity. Critics of transracial adoption go even further than this, however. The NABSW,
for example, argued that one consequence of loss of cultural identity
is loss of "the background and knowledge which is necessary to survive in a racist society.' 8 6 Chimezie phrased this concern most
SIMON & ALTSTEIN If,supira note 61, at 13-14.
181 Id. at 14.
182 Id. at 13-14.
183 SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, sufira note 25, at 102-03; see also In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 797
(D.C.'Ct. App. 1982) (Newman, CJ., dissenting) (testimony of white prospective adoptive
mother as to efforts to cultivate black identity of child previously adopted). The majority in
In reR.M.G. considered these efforts in connection with the first analytical step it required in
such cases-namely, "how each family's race is likely to affect the child's development of a
sense of identity, including racial identity." Id at 791; see also Miller v. Berks County Children & Youth Servs. (Inre Davis), 465 A.2d 614, 628 (Pa. 1983) (noting that white prospective
adoptive parents were not in a position to inculcate a sense of black identity into the mixedrace child).
184 id at 104.
185 SIMON & ALTSTEIN II, supra note 61, at 17-18.
186 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSrION PAPER (Apr. 1973),
quoted in SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 50.
180
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dramatically:
Having never been black, the white adoptive parents might
not have been subjected to the kinds of discriminatory treatment
that have been the lot of black people. Therefore, they might not
have needed to maintain in their cognitive and psychic makeup
the expectation of probable oppressive treatment by whites. Nor
would they have needed to develop perspicacity in divining when
a white person was lying to a black one or to become aware of
areas in which oppressive treatment was likely.
. . .When white adoptive parents are unable to transmit to
the black adoptive child the tendency toward doubt and the temporary suspension of trust, especially when dealing with white
persons, they are failing to satisfy the "psychosurvival" need of
the black child.
Blacks need to have an inclination toward doubt of white
persons as a basic attribute in the fight against racism. .

.

.This

will-is an impordoubt-call it "black paranoia" or what you
87
tant and necessary aspect of black culture.
Rejoinder to rhetoric at such a level is difficult. Simon and Altstein,
however, found that both white and non-white children raised in
mixed-race families were less likely to have pro-white attitudes or to
associate "white" with positive and desirable characteristics than
were both white and non-white children generally. 18 Thus, the
practice of transracial adoption attacked as destroying
"psychosurvival skills" of black children may in itself contribute to
such a change in attitudes that those skills become superfluous. Indeed, those skills might actually handicap the child's ability to learn
"the role of the equal citizen."18 19
If an internal identity crisis arises for the transracially adopted
child, it is expected to occur at adolescence. 19° The majority of parents who have adopted transracially gave this problem some thought
before adopting,' 9 ' so they would be prepared to help their children
cope with any problems that arise. Some of these parents expressed
the hope that American society would change sufficiently before
their child reached adolescence, that he or she would not have
187 Chimezie, supra note 37, at 299; see also In re R.M.G., 424 A.2d 776, 802-03 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1982) (Newman, CJ., dissenting) (discussing black children's need to develop "survival
skills").
188 SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 126, 161.
189 Note, supra note 16, at 362.
190 See D. FANSHEL, supra note 32, at 269; Grossman, supra note 20, at 330; Macaulay &
Macaulay, supra note 13, at 286; Palmer, supra note 46, at 44-45; Comment, supra note 33, at
265; Note, supra note 16, at 361-62.
191 SIMON & ALTSTEIN I, supra note 25, at 98-99.
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problems with interracial friendship and dating.t 92 Some commentators dismiss this issue by saying that time is on the side of the mixedrace family. 193 Such optimism, although commendable, may be a
naive answer to this so-called "puberty argument."' 194 No ready answers appear, however. Adolescence is often a difficult time for any
family, 195 and the puberty argument itself seems to be nothing more
than conjecture, so perhaps no further answer is necessary.
The transracial adoption studies have not followed the children
through adolescence, so they cannot provide definitive answers. But
they do provide some interesting hints. Grow and Shapiro found
that the longer children were in placement, the more likely they were
to have higher scores on the researchers' measure for personal adjustment. This was true despite the fact that children in placement
longer were more likely to be in or approaching adolescence than
96
were children who had been in placement a shorter length of time.1
Grow and Shapiro also found that low scores on the measure for social adjustment correlated not with the age of the child (as the puberty argument would predict), but with the length of time in
placement. 197 Finally, children in placement the longest, who were
therefore the oldest, had the smallest proportion of low scores on the
researchers' neurotic symptoms measure.' 98 These results suggest
that the expectation of adjustment problems in adolescence may be
overblown.199
Despite this lack of empirical research, repetition of the "pu192 Id.
193 Comment, sufira note 33, at 265; Note, supra note 16, at 362.
194 The phrase was apparently coined in Are InterracialHomes Badfor Children, MARRIAGE
ACROSS THE COLOR LINE 72-73 (C. Larsson ed. 1965), and repeated by other writers; Grossman, supra note 20, at 330; Note, supra note 16, at 361.
195 Palmer, supra note 46, at 46.
196 GROw & SHAPIRO I, supra note 21, at 117-18.
197 Children in placement three to four years had the most low scores on this measure; the
proportion of low scores fell for children in placement five to eight years, and then rose again
for children in placement nine years or longer. Id. at 120-21.
198 Id. at 138.
199 Simon and Altstein's follow-up study found that 85% of parents reported that their
children had had no trouble making friends and belonging to groups. The oldest of the children were young teenagers; they were, however, too young to date. SIMON & ALTSTEIN II,
supra note 61, at 12.
McRoy & Zurcher's study of nonrandomly-selected adoptees is the first to follow transracially-adopted black children into adolescence. The researchers found that the children
experienced some racial rejection from potential white dates, but that the adoptees "generally
have some successful interracial dating relationships." R. McRoY & L. ZURCHER, sura note
159, at 82.
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berty argument" has instilled in it a life of its own. InInre R.M.G. ,200
for example, the trial court found it "interesting that all the experts
who appeared in this matter agreed that not enough work has been
done on the subject [of race] as it pertains to adoption" and expressed concern "that little medical or scientific attention has been
devoted to this problem."' 20 1 Yet the trial court noted that "fijt
would seem, however, enirely reasonable that as a child grows older the
ramifications of this problem would increase." 20 2 The dissent was
even more straightforward, acknowledging that "lack of empirical
'20 3
data is especially acute as regards the crucial adolescent years.
Yet the dissent repeated the trial court's finding offact that "'severe
questions of identity arising from the adoption and race most probably would evolve'" later and stated that "[t]he trial court's finding
that such risks exist is more than amply supported by trial testimony. '20 4 Thus, social science speculation is elevated to social science fact. And the "puberty argument" remains speculative, even
though its correspondence with our intuitive guess and supposition
may lead us to overlook the lack of supporting empirical data.
The adjustment of Indian children should be mentioned separately because of the attention given to this issue in the legislative
history of the Indian Child Welfare Act. That history is replete with
references to problems faced by Indians raised in non-Indian homes:
Cultural disorientation, a person's sense of powerlessness, his
loss of self-esteem-these may be the most potent forces at work
[in the high rates of Indian family breakdown]. They arise, in
large measure, from our national attitudes as reflected in longestablished Federal policy and from arbitrary acts of
Government.
One of the effects of our national paternalism has been to so
alienate some Indian patents [sic] from their society that they
abandon their children at hospitals or to welfare departments
rather than entrust them to the care of relatives in the extended
involuntary, arbitrary, and
family. Another expression of it is the
20 5
unwarranted separation of families.
Clinical evidence received by the congressional committee to support
these conclusions, however, did not factor out the injury caused by
200
201
202
203
204
205

454 A.2d 776 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 782 (brackets added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 797 n.5 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 799, 802.
H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 46, at 12; accord, S. REP. No. 597,supra note 47, at 12.
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foster care in general from that caused by interracialcare. 20 6 The detrimental effects of institutional and foster care are well known, and
Indian children have been subjected to foster care and institutionalization in large numbers. The problems in identity and emotional
development experienced by Indians may be caused as much by the
type of care received as by the fact that that care was given primarily
by non-Indians. Certainly, mere documentation of problems experienced by Indians is insufficient to support the conclusion that the
interracial nature of care is the causative factor. Furthermore, at
least one of the problems experienced by Indians-an impaired ability to parent-is strikingly symptomatic of maternal deprivation and
can be attributed to institutionalization and the instabilities of foster
care, 20 7 rather than to interracial care provided in a stable home.
Finally, the small amount of empirical evidence available, provided
by Fanshel, indicates that Indian children who are adopted by white
parents adjust well, especially when contrasted with the probable
alternatives:
First, the results of my research thus far support the view
that the placement of Indian children in white homes appears to
represent a low level of risk for the children with respect to safeguarding their physical and emotional well-being. The repeated
interviews with the adoptive parents left the interviewers with the
strong impression that the children were, by and large, very secure and obviously feeling loved and wanted in their adoptive
homes. Even if the adjustment of the children proves to be somewhat more problematic as they get older-particularly during
adolescence when the factor of racial difference may loom
larger-the overall prospect for their futures can be termed as
"guardedly optimistic." When one contrasts the relative security
of their lives with the horrendous growing up experiences en206 Testimony of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer and a report by Drs. Mindell and Gurwitt,
which was adopted as an official paper by the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, were
the major sources of this clinical evidence. Both of these sources reported that Indian children removed from their families and placed in non-Indian homes were at risk in their later
emotional and intellectual development. Indian Child Welfare Program: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Indian Afairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior & InsularAfairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49
(1974); Hearings, supra note 13, at 114.
207 Warren Weller, director of the Indian Child Abuse and Neglect Center in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, has noted that a significant factor in Indian child abuse and neglect
incidents is the fact that a large number, perhaps 25 percent, of Indian children in
the past have been raised in institutional settings. The institutionalization process
has deprived these children of both parental role models and the experience of living
in a family. As a result, when they mature, they often do not know how to properly
care for a child, interpret a child's actions in a nonhostile manner, and deal with the
stresses of family life.
Davies, supra note 72, at 195; accord, Barsh, supra note 25, at 1290-91.
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dured by their mothers-well documented in the summaries...
received from agencies referring the children-one has to take
the position that adoption
has saved many of these children from
20 8
lives of utter ruination.

Thus, despite the strong evidence that Indians, both children and
adults, are experiencing problems in social and emotional adjustment caused by the child-rearing practices to which they have been
exposed, it is possible that the problems are due to the instability of
those experiences rather than to their interracial nature.
In one respect, interracial care is clearly taking a toll. Indians
raised in non-Indian homes, even in loving and secure homes, are
unable to return to the reservation and live in Indian society because
they lack "skills useful for life on the reservation, such as hunting,
fishing, and wild rice harvesting. ' 20 9 Indian children raised in white
families may be emotionally secure individuals, but the price they
2 10
pay may well be the loss of their cultural identity as Indians.
To summarize, black and Indian children have at least two
identifiable interests-an interest in a stable, loving family and an
interest in cultural identity as a black or Indian. If an in-race family
is not available, these interests operate at cross-purposes and would
lead to opposite results. The interest in a stable family calls for permanent placement in any suitable available family, regardless of
208 D. FANSHEL, supra note 32, at 339. That author cautioned, however, that the children
he studied were still very young.
209 Comment, Tribal Sef-Deermination, supra note 89, at 1204-05. The problem is not a
new one. In 1744, following a treaty signing, representatives of the Maryland and Virginia
colonies invited the Indians to send boys to the College of William and Mary. The Indians
declined:
We know that you highly esteem the kind of learning taught in those Colleges, and
the Maintenance of our young Men, while with you, would be very expensive to
you. We are convinced, that you mean to do us Good by your Proposal; and we
thank you heartily. But you, who are wise must know that different Nations have
different Conceptions of things and you will therefore not take it amiss, if our Ideas
of this kind of Education happen not to be the same as yours. We have had some
Experience of it. Several of our Young People were formerly brought up at the
Colleges of the Northern Provinces; they were instructed in all your Sciences; but,
when they came back to us, they were bad Runners, ignorant of every means of
living in the woods. . . neither fit for Hunters, Warriors, nor Counsellors, they were
totally good for nothing. We are, however, not the less oblig'd by your kind Offer,
tho' we decline accepting it; and, to show our grateful Sense of it, if the Gentlemen
of Virginia will send us a Dozen of their Sons, we will take Care of their Education,
instruct them in all we know, and make Men of them.
DRAKE, 1 BIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA, ch. 35, 27 (3d ed.
1834), quoted in Guerrero, supra note 88, at 51 (omission in original).
210 If they cannot fit into the white world either, they may float between white and Indian
society and be part of neither. See Comment, Tribal Se/f-Determination, supra note 89, at 1205.
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race, and the interest in cultural identity calls for placement only inracially, even if the child has to wait.
V.

A Suggested Normative Heirarchy of Interests
in Transracial Adoptions
A. Determining the Hierarchy

The best interests standard fails to identify all of these oftenconflicting interests, and thus does not provide sufficient guidance for
social workers and judges faced with placement decisions. Despite its
vagueness, however, the best interests test does begin to provide some
guidance for resolution of these conflicts by emphasizing the individual child's interests, rather than those of adoptive children in general 2 "1 or the institutional interests of minority groups or adoption
agencies. Resolution of competing interests in transracial placement
cases should continue that focus, absent the most compelling of interests, for several reasons. First, the well-entrenched legal habit established by the best interest standard is to focus on the affected child.
Indeed, the problem with the standard is not its effort to focus on the
child, but its inability to provide the specificity necessary to guide
decision-makers. Continuation of that focus has the practical advantage of acceptability. Second, child-centered analysis is also normatively preferable.2 ' 2 As Professor Wald has stated, "[n]ot only is the
child a helpless party but the parents should suffer the consequences
of their inadequacy rather than the child. 2 1 3 But the justification
goes further. The child is both the one most vulnerable and most
deeply affected by placement decisions. 21 4 If the children are our future, then the social policy that serves all of us is that policy centered
around the needs of the child whose placement is in issue.
One consequence of a child-centered focus is that social goals
independent of the child's interest, but which can be served by policies governing child placement, must be discounted. For example,
one social goal independent of an individual child's interests is to
211 Cf. Comment, supra note 20, at 764-65.
212 Professor Wald stated that "[t]here has been very little adequate analysis of why children should be favored," and cited Byond the Best Interests ofthe Child with the signal "See."
Wald, supra note 8, at 638 n.76. One cannot tell whether Professor Wald is citing the work of
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit as an example of inadequate analysis to which he referred, or as
a bright spot of adequacy in an otherwise inadequate literature.
213 Id. at 638.
214 The effect on the child's family may also be profound. Removal of a child may cause
the parents to withdraw, become depressed, lose self-esteem, and begin or resume heavy
drinking. Comment, supra note 81, at 654.
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increase the number of black and Indian potential adoptive homes.
That goal might be served by a policy prohibiting transracial placements, designed to build pressure to find minority homes by increasing the number of waiting minority children. To argue that
transracial placement should stop until agencies redesign their standards and procedures, 21 5 however, is to elevate the value of accomplishing such reform, which at best will benefit children coming into
the child welfare system in the future, above the interests of children
waiting now. Such a social goal is not congruent with the interests of
currently waiting children and, therefore, is not an interest appropriately considered under a child-centered policy.
Furthermore, a child-centered focus also requires that difficult
questions surrounding transracial adoption not be ducked by arguments concerning related but peripheral issues. Additional recruitment of black and Indian potential adoptive homes is such an issue.
Another is subsidized adoption, 2 16 which might enable more minority families to adopt. A third is reevaluation of the standards for
initial intervention into families and removal of children from their
biological parents, 2 17 which might reduce the number of children
215 Set generaly Chimezie, supra note 37, at 297; see aso text acc6mpanying notes 41-47
supra.
216 Subsidized adoption provides payments to adoptive parents after the child has been
placed, thus altering the usual practice under which adopting parents assume complete
financial responsibility for the child. These subsidies allow adoption by parents, otherwise
qualified, who do not meet an agency's income guidelines and also enhance adoption opportunities for children with special needs. Several jurisdictions have passed subsidy statutes.
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 16115-16123 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 3-115 (1981); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.115f (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAw §§ 450-458 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1983); see also Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-676 (Supp. V 1981).
Subsidized adoption will reduce the need for transracial adoption only to the extent that
minority couples do not adopt at all, or do not adopt a particular child, for financial reasons.
Social agencies historically have imposed non-economic criteria that were more difficult for
non-white than white couples to meet, see note 46 supra and accompanying text, and subsidy
programs will not alleviate that aspect of the screening process.
For a general discussion of subsidized adoption, see Katz & Gallagher, Subsidized Adoption
in America, 10 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1976).
217 Standards for initial intervention are closely related to adoption policy since many
minority children have become available for adoption as a result of state-initiated termination of parental rights. The issue of appropriate standards, which is not directly pertinent to
this article despite its importance to the child welfare system as a whole, has received thorough and careful attention elsewhere. See, e.g., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 24;
Wald, supra note 8.
The issue of standards for intervention is addressed in the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982), which was passed in response to Congress' findings that state
agencies and courts charged with making intervention decisions were imposing culturally biased interpretations of neglect and abandonment upon Indian families. See notes 79-86 supra
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coming into the child welfare system. All of these efforts are laudable
and attention to them might render unnecessary the policy balancing
this article discusses. But until these efforts produce a closer correlation between the number of waiting minority children and the
number of available minority adoptive homes, child-centered policy
demands that the dilemmas of transracial adoption not be avoided.
To focus on the child is not sufficient, however, because children
have two interests-an interest in a stable family and an interest in
cultural identity. Additionally, child-centered decision-making does
not take other interests into account. One of them-Indian tribes'
institutional interest in their very existence-presents the one circumstance in which value preferences seem weighty enough to override
an individualistic, child-centered approach. Whether there is a societal interest in the continuity of minority groups, apart from the
group's own interest, is a broader, chiefly political issue. In the case
of Indian tribes, which are the only minority groups literally
threatened with extinction, alteration of federal policy from termination and assimilation to self-determination established that cultural
and ethnic heterogeneity is a desirable social goal. When a child
placement decision may remove the child from the tribe, therefore,
the tribe's interest in its own continued existence must also be
weighed.
B. Application of the Heirarchy of Interests to Some Fact Situations
Several different fact patterns arise in transracial adoption cases,
and accompanying text. Congress found "that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies." 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1982). The Act provides that no
foster care placement or termination of parental rights may be ordered unless continued parental custody "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 25
U.S.C. § 1912(e)-() (1982). In addition, for foster care placement, this finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)-() (1982); for termination of
parental rights, the finding must be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, 25
U.S.C. § 1912(0 (1982); cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that due process requires proof by clear and convincing evidence before a state may terminate parental
rights).
Substantive changes in intervention standards and reallocation of responsibility for applying those standards should help reduce the incongruence between the number of adoptable minority children and the number of minority adoptive homes. Focus on the intervention
phase alone, however, is not sufficient because it ignores the plight of children already in the
system and, unless we are prepared to argue that all interventions and removals are the result
of cultural bias, the plight of children who will come into the system in the future. Thus, the
problem of transracial adoption may be diminished by changes at the intervention stage, but
those changes cannot be expected to make questions concerning transracial adoption policy
go away.
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which may be decided under the interests analysis presented here: a
minority child is in institutional or foster care and a white adoptive
family is available; adoption is sought by white foster parents of the
minority child in their care; and a step-parent seeks adoption of a
mixed-race step-child with whom the step-parent is living. The variations on each of these fact patterns will be discussed in turn.
The interests of the child and his or her minority group are incongruent when a child is free for adoption and no in-race adoptive
parents are available. 218 Resolution of such a case depends on which
interests are deemed foremost, and that, in turn, requires normative
selection of the primary value to be served by the placement decision.
If the goal is to maximize the possibility of healthy emotional
growth, then our best information tells us that a stable family is of
paramount importance, and the transracial placement should be
made. If, however, cultural identity is more important, then transracial adoption should not be permitted.
The resolution proposed here is something of a compromise. If
no in-race adoptive parents are available, black children should be
placed with immediately-available white families, but Indian children should wait for a reasonable time while an Indian family is
sought. This proposal is based on the difference in circumstances between blacks and Indians and on the normative preference that
placement decisions should enhance the individual child's emotional
development unless their result would be to threaten the minority
group's very existence; if so, then the group's interest in survival becomes paramount. Although all children suffer equally from foster
and institutional care, the decimation of Indian populations caused
in large part by transracial placement of Indian children mandates
that such placement be avoided if at all possible. An equally compelling countervailing consideration is not present in the transracial
adoption of blacks. Black children, therefore, should not suffer the
218 Whether the child is black or Indian, transracial adoption should not take place if inrace adoptive parents are available and the placement does not pose an added threat to
continuity of the child's care (as it would if the child were removed from white foster parents
who were also seeking to adopt). In-race adoption is always preferred, not because of some
vague notions of matching, but because of the importance of ethnic identity in this heterogeneous society and out of deference to the wishes of many leaders of minority opinion. Cf In re
R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 798 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982) (Newman, Cj., dissenting) ("While there is
a debate among social scientists about the viability of interracial adoption, no one-including
the parties herein and their expert witnesses-contends that such adoptions tend to besupiior
to intraracial adoptions, all other factors equal.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, placement in-race poses no threat to the child's emotional development in these
cases, since the child faces no delay in or denial of adoption.
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emotional damage of continued foster care. The cost each black
child pays individually is not offset by a greater gain to the group or
to society as a whole, as it arguably is in the case of Indian
2 19
children.
If no Indian adoptive family is likely to become available, or if a
reasonable time has passed and no Indian adoptive family has been
found, the appropriate course of action depends upon the situation in
which the Indian child then lives. If the child is institutionalized,
transracial adoption should be allowed. The detriments of institutionalization are so great and the chances of socialization as an Indian so small, that the child's need for a stable family weighs most
heavily. If the child is in non-Indian foster care and a white adoptive
home is available, then no advantage in terms of enhanced cultural
identity as an Indian, either for the child or the tribe, is realized by
denying adoption. Allowing adoption will, on the other hand, permit the child to enjoy the benefits of a stable family.
A difficult case arises if the Indian child is in Indian foster care
and white adoptive parents are available. Continued foster care has
simultaneously the disadvantage of impermanence and uncertainty,
with the added risk that the child may become increasingly hard to
place for adoption as he or she grows older, and the advantage of
preserving Indian cultural identity. Adoptive placement, conversely,
has the advantage of permanence and security. The dilemma should
be resolved by leaving the child in Indian foster care. 22 0
219 Although this article addresses transracial adoption of only black and Indian children,
see note 3 supra, an interested reader can easily apply this policy proposal to other minority
groups, such as Asians or Hispanics. If the continued existence of such a minority group is
genuinely threatened by transracial adoption of their children (which, as far as this writer
knows, is not the case with Asians and Hispanics), then these adoptions should not take place.
Otherwise, the interest of the child in a stable and permanent home should outweigh the
potential loss of cultural identity.
220 A similar fact situation arose in Oregon ex rel Juvenile Dep't, Multnomah County v.
England, 292 Or. 545, 640 P.2d 608 (1982) (en banc), although the opinion does not indicate
where the child was placed following removal from her Indian foster mother. In that case,
the state agency took legal custody of an Indian child and placed her in the foster care of her
Indian maternal aunt. A hearing was held at which it was decided to remove the child from
her aunt's custody; the natural mother received notice of the hearing, but the aunt received
neither formal nor actual notice. She moved for reconsideration, arguing that she had "legal
custody" and thus was an "Indian custodian," entitled to notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6) (1982). The court rejected her argument, concluding that the
Act used the phrase "legal custody" as a term of art, and therefore, that legal custody rested
with the state agency.
This case is difficult to evaluate under the guidelines proposed here because the alternatives available for the child are not known. It does appear, however, that the result is contrary to the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act, as the dissent argued, 640 P.2d at 614
(Tongue, J., dissenting). Extension of procedural protection to the maternal aunt in this case
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Clearly, preference for the interests of the tribe is at the expense
of the child's emotional development. If best interests means a placement most conducive to healthy psychological growth, this result is
contrary to it. In this case, the child pays the price for the tribe's
welfare.
The result that the Indian Child Welfare Act mandates, which
is consistent with the proposal offered here, is appropriate for the
reasons stated in this article. The Act can be criticized, however, for
failing to articulate the value preferences it embodies. It is predicated on the assumption that the "best interest" of the affected child
is to remain with the tribe. 22' Granted that the tribes have a strong
interest in maintaining contact with and even control over Indian
children, but it does not follow, as one commentator has asserted,
that "[s]ince Indian children are crucial to the continued existence of
Indian tribes and culture, the best interest of the Indian child is also
the best interest of the Indian tribe." 222 This viewpoint fails to recognize the inherent conflict between the child's and tribe's mutual associational interests and the child's interest in stability and
permanency. The Act does purport to further the mutual associational interest, but it may in fact serve to exacerbate the instability
and impermanence to which Indian children have been subjected.
That consequence may be necessary in order to preserve the tribes,
but the Act should make that policy choice clear.
The Act increases instability and impermanence for Indian children in several ways. Congressional reports laid the blame for the
shockingly high rates of Indian child placement on the insensitivity
of state child welfare agencies and courts to Indian culture, and identified the state-run foster care system as seriously harmful to Indian
children: 223 It is ironic, then, that once an Indian child is in foster
care the Act may operate to leave him or her there because of the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required to terminate parental rights, and thus to free the child for adoption. 224 If parental
would have served the values of continuity and, possibly, of cultural identity and tribal association (if the alternative placement was with a non-Indian or non-tribe member family). Furthermore, extension of procedural protection would not have prevented the agency from
making, nor the court from approving, an alternative placement, 640 P.2d at 617 n.7; it
merely would have increased the likelihood that evidence favorable to the aunt and, perhaps,
to the Indian culture generally would be introduced.
221 See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
222 Note, In re D.L. & C.L.L., Minors: Ruling on the Constitutionality of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 26 S.D.L. REv.67, 74 (1981).
223 See notes 80-87 supra and accompanying text.
224 H.R. REP. No. 1386, stpra note 46, at 46 (Dissent of Rep. Marlenee, quoting Recom-

[Vol. 59:503]

TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION

rights cannot be terminated, but the child's home situation is such
that he or she cannot be returned, then the child will remain "adrift"
in the "limbo" 225 of foster care. The Act permits further instability
by allowing a parent who has voluntarily consented to foster care to
withdraw that consent at any time; and a parent who has consented
to termination of parental rights or to adoption may withdraw consent for any reason at any time before a final decree of termination or
adoption is entered.2 26 In both cases, withdrawal of consent allows
the parent to recover custody of the child, thus subjecting the child to
discontinuity of care.
Two illustrative cases have arisen. In A.B.M. v. M.H &A.H ,227
an unmarried Indian mother consented to adoption of her child by
her sister and brother-in-law. A final decree of adoption was entered
when the child was seven months old, but the decree was vacated due
to procedural irregularities. The natural mother then attempted to
withdraw her consent and obtain custody of the child. The trial
court refused to permit withdrawal of consent and, applying state
law standards, determined that adoption was in the best interests of
the child. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, holding the Indian
Child Welfare Act applicable. Under the Act, the court must grant a
biological parent's petition for return of custody after a final adoption decree is vacated, unless a showing is made, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that return is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.228 Because the
hearing granted by the trial court did not meet this standard, the
mendations of the Social Services Committee of the National Council of State Public Welfare
Administrators); Wamser, supra note 33, at 426.
But see In re J.L.H. & P.L.L.H., 316 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1982); In re R.M.M. III, 316
N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1982); In re Fisher, 31 Wash. App. 550, 643 P.2d 887 (1982); and In re
S.R., 323 N.W.2d 885 (S.D. 1982), holding that the evidence established beyond a reasonable
doubt that an Indian parent's continued custody would likely result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child. These cases may indicate that the standard will not be nearly
as difficult to meet in practice as it seems to be in theory.
Although In re SR. did hold that the standard was met, the case may not be good authority for the proposition that the standard as applied has eroded. In that case, both parents
were Indians, and the child was living with her father. Termination of the mother's rights,
therefore, amounted to little more than a permanent bar to custody claims by the mother; the
child's association with her tribe and the continuity of her care were unaffected.
225 These are favorite words to describe the foster care system. See Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 836 (1977); Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 13, at 273,
293.
226 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b)-(c) (1982).
227 651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied sub. noor. Hunter v. Maxie, 103 S. Ct. 1893
(1983).
228 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912, 1916 (1982).
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Court reversed and remanded. The child was then two and one half
years old.

229
The Indian child in In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action

was also subjected to substantial discontinuity because of the Act.
The Indian mother withdrew her consent to adoption when the child
was seven months old, and before entry of a final decree of adoption.
The prospective adoptive parents refused to relinquish the child,
however, and petitioned for termination of parental rights on
grounds of abandonment. The tribe requested transfer of jurisdiction, but the trial court denied the request and severed parental
rights. The appellate court reversed under the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 230 thus returning the child to a biological parent he had never
known.
By allowing a parent to withdraw consent to termination or
adoption at any time before entry of a final decree, the Act makes
placement for adoption more difficult, since "[flew families, Indian
or non-Indian, will risk the emotional commitment necessary to
adopt a child when that child can be summarily removed. Once
'23
again the child runs the risk of being left in extended foster care." '
Adding the irony of underfunded and unmonitored family development programs, 232 the cumulative effect of the Act may be to leave
Indian children in non-Indian foster care in the name of cultural
identity and at the cost of the child's emotional development.
Frank recognition of this "tragic choice" 233 may be necessary if

the Act is to gain the support of social workers and judges who will
ultimately be responsible for its implementation and, therefore, its
success or failure. For example, the social worker involved in In re
Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action 23 4 recognized that the Act may
229 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
230 The court held that the child's legal domicile was on the reservation with his mother,
thus giving the tribe exclusive jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act. 635 P.2d at
191. In the alternative, the court held that if the child was not domiciled on the reservation,
the tribal court had concurrent jurisdiction and that no good cause to deny transfer was
present. Id at 191-92. Finally, the court held that even if the state court properly refused to
transfer the case, the termination was not supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
as the Act required. d at 192-93.
231 Wamser, supra note 33, at 427; see atso Hearings,supra note 13, at 479-503 (letters sent to
the Committee).

Wamser argued that the state adoption act, which allows withdrawal of consent to adoption only if that consent was obtained by fraud or duress, will avoid the problem of revocable
consent. Wamser, supra note 33, at 427-28. He did not, however, recognize or address possible supremacy clause difficulties with his argument.
232 See notes 118-25 supra and accompanying text.
233

Cf

234

130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).

G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).

[Vol. 59:503]

TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION

adversely affect the emotional well-being of children. In that case, as
discussed above, an Indian mother withdrew her consent to adoption
when the child was seven months old. The prospective adoptive parents refused to return the child, although the biological mother was
within her rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The adoption
worker testified on behalf of the adoptive parents at the hearing on
their motion to terminate the mother's parental rights:
I feel that the child's security in the home would be in jeopardy if
the child were moved.
I felt also frankly that the law is unfair, that it does not specifically acknowledge the best interests of the child. And I had
young
serious reservations as to what was now prompting this
23 5
woman [the biological mother] to change her decision.
When white foster parents of a black or Indian child seek to
adopt, then the child's interest in a stable family takes on enhanced
significance. Not only is he or she offered a permanent home, but
that home represents continuity of care. Presumably no in-race foster parents were available at the time of placement or transracial
foster placement would not have been made initially. But what if inrace foster parents are now available, so that the choice is between
transracial adoption and in-race foster care? Following the value
preferences stated above, transracial adoption should be allowed for
the black child, but the Indian child should be moved to the Indian
foster home in which he or she can enjoy the benefits of a family with
Indian cultural ties, despite the discontinuity of care to which he or
she will be subjected. Adoption should be granted to the white foster
parents of the black child, however, even if a black adoptive home is
immediately available.
This was the situation in the well-known case of Drummond v.
Fulton County Department of Famiy and ChiidrensServices.2 3 6 Timmy, a
mixed-race child, was placed with the Drummonds when he was one
month old. Within a year, the Drummonds expressed an interest in
adopting him. When Timmy was fifteen months old, caseworkers
told the Drummonds that the agency planned to find a black adoptive family for Timmy. An agency staff meeting was held when
Timmy was two years old and a final decision was made to remove
him from the Drummonds. They filed suit simultaneously in state
235 635 P.2d at 192 (brackets added). The court responded, with some insensitivity, that
"[a]ny potential emotional trauma to the child if the contemplated adoption is aborted was
engendered by the conduct of the adoptive parents not adhering to the mandates of the Act."
Id at 193.
236 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
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and federal court, 23 7 but both suits were dismissed. 2 38 During the
appeals, Timmy was removed from the Drummond's home. He was
then thirty months old.
Concededly, ethnic identity will be diminished, even when
white parents are willing to accept help from the child welfare
agency in building their black child's racial identity. But the known
damage caused by discontinuity is powerful enough that the least
detrimental alternative, from the child's point of view, is transracial
adoption. Arguably, the balance should shift if the black child has
not been in the home long enough to form psychological ties to the
white foster parents; the detrimental effects of discontinuity are lessened, and the child could be moved to an available black adoptive
home. On the other hand, even though full-blown psychological
parenthood has not yet developed, some discontinuity would result
from moving the child to the black adoptive home. 23 9 Given the
large number of black children available for adoption, another black
child should be placed in the home. Only if a black adoptive home
would otherwise be unutilized should a child be moved from a home
in which he or she is already settled.
237 The Drummonds sought a preliminary injunction in both courts barring removal of
Timmy from their home, appointment of a guardian ad litem for him, and an adjudication
that the agency unconstitutionally used race in denying their request for adoption. In addition, in the state suit the Drummonds requested an order requiring the agency to consent to
their adoption of Timmy. See note 238 infia.
238 Dismissal of the state suit was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court, 228 S.E.2d 839
(Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 905, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). A panel of the Fifth
Circuit reversed dismissal of the federal suit, 547 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1977), but the full court
then reversed the panel decision, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
910 (1978).
239 The risk of discontinuity is exacerbated by trial and appellate courts that "lumber
along at their typical snail's pace," Miller v. Berks County Children & Youth Servs. (In re
Davis), 465 A.2d 614, 632 (Pa. 1983). If a child is left during appeal with white foster parents
who lost at trial, affirmance of the trial court's decision raises the spectre of removing the
child from a home to which he or she is only the more firmly attached by passage of time.
This led the In re Davis court to remand for further proceedings, rather than to order summary transfer of the child to a black foster home. Id at 632-33; see also In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d
776 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982). In that case, a black child, D., was placed with white foster parents
in Jan., 1978, at the age of three-and-one-half months. When they sought to adopt, their
petition was opposed by D.'s black paternal grandmother and step-grandfather. Id at 780.
Petitioners lost at trial, but D. remained in their home pending appeal. Id at 782. The
appellate court reversed and remanded in Dec., 1982, and the matter is currently pending on
remand. D. remains with her foster parents. Telephone interview with Julian Karpoff, attorney for petitioner-appellants (Feb. 10, 1984).
On the other hand, if the child is removed from white foster parents upon their loss at
trial, then reversal on appeal subjects the child to two wrenching transfers. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Portage County Welfare Dep't v. Summers, 38 Ohio St. 2d 144, 155-56, 311 N.E.2d 6, 13
(1974) (Herbert, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION

The final category of cases arises when adoption is sought by a
white step-parent with whom a black or Indian child and his or her
biological parent has been living. Adoption should be granted, because the biological parent's presence assures the requisite ties to ethnic heritage. If the child is of mixed race, however, and the
biological parent who is present is white, the child may lose the ties
to his or her minority heritage. But this loss would occur even without the step-parent adoption. Adoption, therefore, would legitimize
the child in the home in which he or she would continue to live anyway, 24° and it would have no independent effect on the child's opportunities for cultural identity.
VI. Conclusion
There is very little to recommend transracial adoption-except
that the alternatives are so often worse. Being raised by parents who
share their child's racial, cultural, and ethnic heritage has value, and
this deserves recognition. But the preservation of ethnic identity is a
social goal separate from the goals of the adoption system, and that
system should not be subverted into the service of other social goals
save for the most pressing of reasons. Preservation of discrete ethnic
and social groups, however, is such a normatively superior goal.
Even if a different normative hierarchy is preferred, the best interests concept should be broken down analytically into its component parts. Only in this way can social workers, and the judges who
must review their decisions, clarify the policies to be served and work
toward results that enhance the emotional growth of children without unduly harming cultural diversity.

240 The court followed this reasoning in In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448
(D.C. Cir. 1955). See also In re Gomez, 424 S.W. 2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), in which the
court, in addition to the "legal considerations," noted that granting the adoption would allow
the children to receive benefits as dependents of their serviceman-stepfather. Id at 659.

